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Article 9

Plunging Into Darkness: Energy Deregulation
Collides with Scarcity
ProfessorRobert C. Fellmeth *
In 1969, The Ralph Nader Study Group Report on the Interstate
Commerce Commission and TransportationI advocated the substantial
deregulation of interstate trucking. The consumer group found that
"rate bureaus" of horizontally organized private truckers served as
legally authorized cartels to collusively fix shipping rates. The
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) rubberstamped these
regionally formulated industry-set prices. The agency reinforced an
anticompetitive structure by issuing narrow licenses of convenience and
necessity. These licenses specified the areas a trucker would serve,
equipment to be used, commodities to be carried, and even routes to be
traversed. A carrier might well have authority to carry photographic
film but not developed pictures; rubber hose but not plastic tubing.
Common carrier trucking was highly inefficient, with substantial
mileage consisting of empty backhauls. And tariffs tended to be set
high enough to assure the survival of the most inefficient carriers
competing. Nor were assured portions of revenues directed at the
"external benefits" often cited to justify industry-dominated public
policies, such as safety, reliable availability, or service to rural areas.
Trucking consists of relatively small units of production, which are
obviously highly mobile. The barriers to entry to increase supply are
* Price Professor in Public Interest Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Professor
Fellmeth is a graduate of Stanford University (A.B. 1967) and Harvard University (J.D. 1970).
He is a former state and federal antitrust prosecutor and, in 1979, founded the Center for Public
Interest Law (CPIL), a statewide advocacy group centered at the University of San Diego School
of Law. CPIL specializes in consumer representation before state agencies, including the Public
Utilities Commission (PUC). CPIL publishes the CaliforniaRegulatory Law Reporter. Professor
Fellmeth has taught regulatory law (utility regulation), antitrust law, and public interest law since
1977. He has chaired a state agency and served as the State Bar Discipline Monitor for five
years. He has also been active in the PUC and legislative advocacy for the consumer and has
litigated twenty-five reported appellate cases. Professor Fellmeth has authored thirteen books and
treatises, including California White Collar Crime (with Thomas A. Papageorge) (Michie, 1998,
2001).
1. See ROBERT C. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC
INTEREST AND THE ICC (1970).
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low. Capacity can adjust to demand relatively quickly. In other words,
it is not a high fixed threshold cost industry and not a natural monopoly
that might warrant price regulation to prevent monopoly power pricing.
The Nader Report was controversial in its time. Consumerists were
considered "standard liberals," backers of government intervention in
the marketplace. To that point, they had not supported deregulation,
instead recommending additional governmental controls to ameliorate
external costs flowing from dangerous products, misleading advertising,
or other cited market abuses. A new thesis emerged from this and other
work: Government used by commercial interests to restrict competition
for private gain and public detriment could be the problem. In contrast,
the marketplace could be the consumer's friend.
But here is the problem: It is not always a faithful friend. Indeed, it
occasionally needs a chaperone.
I. THE DEREGULATION THEORY

A. TraditionalRationale
The traditional rationale of much deregulation in the modem era is as
follows: We engage in maximum price regulation primarily because of
natural monopoly problems. An economist might define such a
monopoly as an industry in which "economies of scale continue for a
single fixed plant structure across the entire range of expected
demand."-2 In other words, only one enterprise can operate efficiently.
Why build a second set of railroad tracks when all the trains we have
can use one track? Such natural monopolies normally exist with a high
threshold cost structure, such that we want to maximize the efficiency
of that initial capital investment.
But technology can change the economics of an industry. And it is
possible to isolate an initial fixed cost part of an industry and regulate
just that part, while freeing aspects previously regulated to open
competition. That has been the theory of much deregulation. Hence,
we have isolated the aspects of telecommunications that remain a
natural monopoly (the so-called "loop" which provides the wires into
people's homes) and maintained the maximum rate regulation, while
freeing up previously regulated ancillary services and long distance
transmission for competition. Those aspects were closer to trucking in
their economic structure-small and adjustable units of production, low
barriers to entry, room for many competitors both to operate efficiently

2.

THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL., ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 15-17 (2d ed. 1985).
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and to flourish. And the underlying thesis has merit. Indeed, in the
paradigm example of natural monopoly, our railroads, we could
theoretically create utilities to own just the track, yards, and switching
facilities-the clearest high fixed cost aspect of the enterprise. Then we
could leave the trains (engines and cars) to competition, as we have
arranged for air travel, with public ownership of its highest threshold
cost aspect-our airports.
This basic theory of constricting the area of regulation to the
inevitable high threshold cost aspect of an industry and freeing
remaining parts for competition is at the heart of the modern
deregulation movement. It certainly drives energy deregulation. As
energy demand has expanded and generation diversity increased, large
numbers of different kinds of generators have been able to "feed the
grid." Why not confine price regulation again to the "loop" feeding
individual, houses and businesses and allow the generators to compete?
Why not bring the magic of the marketplace to this important industry?
It brings the "invisible hand"-demand driven from the bottom up, the
democratic marketplace, natural selection culling the inefficient, an
efficient system, and quickly responsive to informed buyers.
B. The Three Common HistoricalFlaws of
DeregulationImplementation
Notwithstanding its promise, three common flaws of deregulation
implementation have repeatedly betrayed it. All three have coalesced to
undermine energy deregulation in California. The price now being paid
in our largest state for those errors is momentous for small business,
consumers, and basic infrastructure. The indirect victims are many and
include the children who rely on public investment, now foregone as the
state spends billions of dollars for energy purchases at outlandish prices,
and where ratepayer repayment will be painful and remains uncertain.
New general fund investment in children, badly needed in California,
has been substantially stymied. 3
1. Forgetting the Lesson of Aristotle: The Extreme Pendulum Swing
Aristotle's most famous maxim was "moderation, moderation in all
things." We repeatedly forget that simple lesson when we deregulate.
Rather, the adherents of deregulation remove state control and, relying
on the mirage of the "unfettered marketplace," walk away to allow the
3. For a detailed description of the budgetary shortfall for children, see Children's Advocacy
Institute, California Children's Btdget 2001-02, at http://www.sandiego.edu/childrensissues (last
visited Apr. 4, 2002).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

magic of competition to do its work. But as argued below, competitive
markets do not operate in a vacuum. Our underlying commercial sector
is subject to far more than the UCC or a civil and criminal justice
system, but also to antitrust monitoring and consumer protection
statutes.
The deregulation of airlines illustrates the pendulum swing flaw of
"walk-away and utopia follows" ipso facto. A review of airline fares
illustrates what happens with extreme abandonment. One certitude
about human behavior perhaps more reliable than greed, lust, or
gluttony is the following: An enterprise with monopoly power will use
it for advantage in available competitive sectors. And usually that
competitive sector will thereby become distorted.4 Hence, if one wishes
to fly from Juneau to Anchorage on Alaska Airlines, one will pay more
than three times the per passenger mile fare than the same airline will
charge in markets where it is subject to competition. Locational price
discrimination patterns become the rule rather than the exception and
operate in extremis, having little to do with cost. Remember the
guidepost: Competition normally drives prices toward cost plus a
reasonable rate of return. When that standard is violated, one needs to
ask why. Nevertheless, the Robinson-Patman Act 5 is effectively
suspended for this industry for reasons traceable to its status as
"deregulated."
Nor is price discrimination the only suspicious outcome of
deregulation. Would a free market support the current: "If you stay
over Saturday, the fare is $300; if you do not, it is $2,000"? Such a
policy is common in airline tariffs today. If the cost is $270, in a free
market the $2,000 figure will be undercut to obtain business until it is
reduced to close to $300. Nor do utilization or other cost- or demandbased factors explain such wide disparities. They rather reflect the kind
6
of price discrimination necessarily exercised by price fixing cartels.

4. Instead of a fair contest in which victory is determined by choices made by consumers,
prices are based on different variables determined from the top. The degree of monopoly, the
nature of the barriers to entry, the size of competitors, and business tactics will determine prices
and service, rather than the bottom-driven forces that the ideal market reflects.
5. Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
6. Price variations normally exist in a perfect free market, usually between marginal cost and
fully distributed cost. Hence, a movie theater will charge less for the 6:00 P.M. show to attract an
audience otherwise not obtainable and more fully utilize its fixed costs. Similarly, an airline
would be expected to lower fares for space available traffic, as they do. But the pattern emerging
from the deregulated airlines is a different kind of price discrimination. Prices are not varied
down toward marginal cost where there is excess capacity, but up above fully distributed cost to
capture business willing to pay more. It is the surcharge of double the regular price to the
wealthy albino gentleman for sun tan lotion practice that is here in evidence. This latter form of
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In the area of consumer protection, other abuses appear. How many
"frequent flyer miles" do you have? After you obtain enough for an
award, is your flight available for reservation? Or are the airlines
allocating a token number of seats for such flights to effectively bar
their use by those promised discount fare benefits? Many of us have
sought reservations six months in advance or more, only to be told that
the only way to redeem the award is to fly at 1:00 A.M. via Duluth and
Fort Lauderdale. If you ask for a full fare reservation, it is immediately
forthcoming. When consumer advocates, joined by the Attorneys
General of numerous states, attempted to prosecute this and other
common airline fare advertising deceptions, the Supreme Court held
that the airlines were "preempted." In a baffling decision, the Court
found that deregulation conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the now
jurisdictionless federal government. 7 The Morales case serves as the
paradigm illustration of this first flaw in deregulation-the pendulum
shift from often excessive regulation to wholesale exception from the
basic underlying market rules and interventions generally applicable to
all commerce. Deregulation means the removal of an aspect of
regulation, not carte blanche immunity from marketplace rules, antitrust
law, and fair competition statutes.
Another especially timely example of this consumer protection
surrender is the remonstrations of Public Citizen and other consumer
advocates over the last twenty years to improve airline safety, especially
the security of the doors to the cockpit. Heeding their advice on this
simple and oft-reiterated point may have saved many lives on
September 11. Instead, the state acceded to the cost-benefit ratios of
private calculation, which considered harm to the airline and perhaps
recoverable passenger damages, but excluded the damage outside the
plane itself.
A newly deregulated industry is particularly vulnerable to
competitive market abuses. The market is new and the scramble for
business often intense. The field of commerce often involves reliance
by third parties on continuity and predictability. And critically,
continuing interconnection with a remaining monopoly power sector

division of the market to "capture the maximum" that different segments are willing to pay is a
reflection not of competition, but of cartel pricing abuse.
7. Morales v. Trans World Airlines held that 49 U.S.C. app. 1305(a)(1) prohibits any state
enforcement of any law "relating to rates, routes, or services" of any air carrier. Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). The section is included in the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, which Justice Scalia's flawed opinion contends not only removes federal
jurisdiction, but bars otherwise applicable state deceptive advertising obligation applicable to
unregulated business in general. See id. at 380-83.
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poses the common problem of monopoly power abuse or extension. As
noted above, a former monopoly power enterprise will inevitably
attempt to leverage its advantage into available competitive areas. It
may well obtain advantage not based on bottom up (consumer) choice
or efficient performance, but from the mere fact of market power for a
related service or product. The extension of AT&T's monopoly into
phone equipment dominance was one of the bases for its antitrust
dissolution. If you wanted to use a Toshiba speakerphone, barriers were
placed in your way to favor the utility's own phone equipment
operations at Western Electric. The examples of such distortions are
legion in the field of antitrust, so prevalent that they may be anticipated
wherever the error is made to allow a remaining monopoly power
enterprise to have anything to do with its competitive sector aspect.
Such problems remain endemic in telecommunications where the local
Bells now seek to compete for long distance and other services while
maintaining control of the monopoly loop locally.
2. Failure to Account for External Costs
The second common flaw in deregulation implementation is the
failure to maintain external benefits or ameliorate external costs. As
noted above, the "free market" does not operate in a vacuum. Human
beings decide whether a rule of liability will assess the water pollution
costs imposed on fishers downstream, or on non-commercial users of
water to a plant causing the pollution. There is no automatic default
rule optimally preventing "free ride" profit by way of cost imposition on
others. Regulation allows adjustments to be made for overall equity or
social benefit. Allowing our poorest citizens to have access to the
telephone by charging them only the marginal cost of its provision
benefits all of us, making our society more integrated, enhancing
communication for overall benefit. Even affirmative cross-subsidies
may provide overall advantage-the world is not always a zero-sum
game.
Energy deregulation is itself the most important example of such a
need. We are using nonrenewable resources at a prodigious rate. We
operate a nuclear power plant with a byproduct of dangerously
radioactive material with a half-life of more than 100,000 years. We
have argued for twenty years over where to put this material. Nobody
wants it. The plant itself will have radioactive status for a substantial
period. This external cost is generated by a plant that will last perhaps
thirty years. What will our legatees in 100 years have to say about
resource depletion and radioactive waste as our external cost? What
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magical use will oil or natural gas, long since depleted, potentially offer
in 100 or 200 years, if we have sacrificed it for ourselves?
Those of us in California live under the most powerful energy source
in the universe: The sun. Apart from geothermal, wind, and water
resources, the sun could provide adequate power for the twenty million
people in Southern California. Beyond photovoltaics, parabolic mirrors
the size of a garage roof can generate more energy than any house
would ever need, and short-term storage is increasingly feasible by
flywheel or battery. The technology to provide ample energy, even as
we eschew conservation, has been within our reach for more than
twenty years, as Buckminster Fuller instructed us a generation ago.
Will energy deregulation make the kinds of cross-subsidies more
likely to keep faith with our intergenerational obligation? Our parents
and grandparents sacrificed for us. Are we to be the ones to break the
chain of that promise? The evidence regrettably suggests such a breach,
whether one looks to investment in higher education capacity, housing
prices and property taxation for the young, or a host of other policies.
The squandering of our natural resources for the current generation's
use was addressed only marginally by energy regulators. But will more
responsible legislators be able to correct this continuing failure without
the use of regulatory cross-subsidies? Will they be able to compel a
politically powerful industry to adopt practices disparate from the "free
market" rules they have just conferred and which do not reflect the
long-range interests and ethical sensibilities of the citizenry? The
record with other deregulated industries is a diminution in external
benefit/cost adjustments and increased reliance on the default rules of
the marketplace. These rules tend to internalize into the market
primarily through tort civil suit where corporate negligence imposes
visible, immediate, focused and legally cognizable damage-and then
only for a small percentage of such cost imposition.
3. Scarcity
The most obvious flaw in deregulation arises from scarcity defects in
the underlying market newly relied upon. Under the ideal market,
supply may be increased as demand warrants. Where it is restricted,
excess profit from scarcity alone may be obtainable. Although
allocation to those able and willing to pay a higher price may be
advisable, external costs may be implicated as prices rise. The scarcity
problem is not triggered by absolute scarcity, but by a substantial time
or cost component required where supply must increase to meet
demand.
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Energy is the paradigm economic sector where scarcity is concerned.
It is one of the few products for which service is provided on a blank
check basis. First we use the service, and then we are billed. In the
long run price changes may influence demand, but not in the short run.
Electricity is also an underlying product. Substantial investment has
been made relying on its availability at predicted levels and costs. That
investment permeates our society, from refrigeration and indoor
ambient temperature to the pizza ovens of the corner restaurant to the
lights at intersections, on the streets, and at the public university. It
touches virtually every aspect of our lives. Its unexpected unavailability
causes a ripple effect of disruption and damage far beyond the energy
industry's own domain.
The focus of deregulation has been on the freeing of non-natural
monopoly sectors of an industry for competition-driven consumer
advantage. Power generation is not a natural monopoly given the huge
demand of modern grids. Ten or more separate and competing concerns
may well vie in a marketplace for its provision, for the common gain.
But deregulation's champions have forgotten that when scarcity
occurs-and it need not be permanent scarcity-the external costs may
be momentous. Combine that danger with an oligopoly capable of price
gaming and market rules that provide a strong incentive to escalate
prices parallel to a cartel or monopoly pattern, and the danger is
magnified.
Remove antitrust monitoring and provide a price
"detection" mechanism to allow five market-dominating energy
producers to play off each other's prices. Add in the removal of
external benefit obligations. Then factor in a class of rate consultants
whose task is to predict demand and obtain maximum revenue--each
well aware that bidding and pricing can be a non-zero sum game where
all involved can profit. Add to the cauldron the characteristics of
energy noted above: blank check provision before cost assessment,
relatively low elasticity of demand to price changes, and an underlying
commodity, and the witches' brew is complete.
Ideally, one might add a final element to make certain that the fatal
elixir is sufficiently lethal. Have the utilities that present the bills and
actually deliver the energy serve as the pseudo-innocent middle-entity
victims. They have to collect the charges imposed by the energy
providers. If they do not pay, they must declare bankruptcy and risk
energy cut-off by out-of-state energy concerns. Further, they have a
constitutionally embedded right to a "fair rate of return" on their
investment, including the recovery of all "prudent costs" incurred.
These utilities are no longer under substantial state jurisdiction, having
been deregulated. The utilities that remain regulated are simply pass-
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through collectors with a constitutionally based claim to full
compensation. Although utilities are profiting from generation plant
sales and some are controlled by parents with natural gas and other
energy assets well enriched by the high prices, they all have publicly
professed victim status. And at least as the law facially reads, -whether
disingenuous charade or not, their posture may be legally impregnable.
Checkmate.
C. Energy Deregulationin California:The EmpiricalRecord
When the theory met the grid in California, all three deregulation
flaws appeared. A consumer-sponsored initiative in 1998 to unwind
deregulation was defeated three to one and was outspent by energy
8
providers and utilities by more than twenty to one.
1. The Rigging of the Game: 1996-2000
From the 1990s to the present, California energy rate regulation has
proceeded in a time-continuum as follows: (1) traditional "fair rate of
return" ratemaking, which allows for prudent costs and a return on
capital investment; (2) "performance-based" ratemaking, which takes
prior costs and credits the utility with efficiency gains to add profit and
incentive (either to supplement fair rate of return ratemaking, or, more
ominously, to substantially replace it); (3) "transition" ratesetting for the
utility operations which will remain under regulation as assets are sold
or released for competition based pricing (such as power generation);
and (4) "post-transition" ratesetting for the remaining monopoly power
utility.
The progression of regulatory policy through these four stages has
created a phalanx of new terms of art, acronyms, agencies, and
proceedings that can bewilder those with knowledge of the historical
tradition of energy regulation. Included as the Appendix is a brief
glossary of new terms that may assist in understanding related
regulatory proceedings. The "players" include three major private
utilities-Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), covering northern California;
Southern California Edison (SCE), covering southern California outside
of San Diego, and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), covering San
Diego. Five communities have publicly provided power. The five
major power generators who have purchased the utility decommissioned plants are Dynegy, Duke, Mirant, Reliant, and Southern.

8. See Kenneth Howe, State Initiatives-Most Costly Campaign Ever, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 5,
1998, at A19, available at 1998 WL 3927011.
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California's deregulation experiment formally began with the Public
Utilities Commission's December 1995 decision to deregulate the
state's $23 billion electricity industry. Under the new regime, the PUC
maintains regulation of the power distribution grid (e.g., the rights of
way and wiring which bring power into homes and businesses), but
subjects power generation to competition.
The Commission's decision required approval by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) which regulates interstate energy
matters, including wholesale energy sales. It also required the approval
of the state legislature. Legislative approval occurred in 1996 with the
confirmation of most of the PUC's initiative through the enactment of
A.B. 1890.9 Effective March 1, 1998, the new law created an
"Independent System Operator" (ISO) to assume control of the power
grid that transmits electricity statewide between the respective utilities
controlling local delivery. 10 It also created a second agency, the Power
Exchange (PX), to function as a stock exchange (or a commodities11
market), enabling sellers and buyers to bargain for electricity price.
A.B. 1890 authorized "direct access"-direct transactions can occur
between electricity suppliers and end use customers without effective
interference from the utility carrying the electricity. 12 A.B. 1890 also
outlined a general plan to accomplish the "unbundling," or separation,
of the three distinct functions of electricity service: (1) generation, (2)
transmission, and (3) distribution (including the unbundling of the
maintenance of electricity lines, metering, and billing). 13 Thus, under
the new scheme, the traditional local utility-now called a "utility
distribution company" (UDC)-continues to transmit electricity to end
users, but generation and some aspects of distribution (such as metering
and billing) are removed from direct private utility control and placed
under a competitive format managed by the ISO or the PUC. Power
generators are now called "electricity service providers" (ESPs).
A.B. 1890 also permits utilities to charge ratepayers a "competition
transition cost" (CTC) to compensate them for "stranded costs" or
"sunk investments" in imprudent power generation facilities; for a time,
the CTC appeared as a special itemized cost on energy bills. Further,
the utilities were allowed to freeze the price of electricity for residential
and small business users at high 1996 levels (about 50% above the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

A.B. 1890, 1996 Leg. (Cal. 1996) (Brulte).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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national average). The new law also required the utilities to give
consumers a 10% reduction in electricity rates from those in effect on
June 10, 1996. This rate reduction was effective January 1, 1998 and
continues until the earlier of March 31, 2002, or such earlier time as
14
each utility fully recovers its transition costs (the "transition period").
Finally, the bill promised ratepayers an "anticipated result" of "no less
than a 20% reduction" in post-transition rates. 15 As events have
unfolded, these mandated savings have also not occurred.
The PUC's implementation of the new scheme has been fraught with
problems. Consumer advocates argue that a new and complicated set of
terms of art and multi-step proceedings has been created. The current
process breaks rate regulation into "transition period" and "posttransition period" phases and separates rules and factors for individual
decision making into fragmented hearings not amenable to
comprehensive coverage by underfinanced consumer groups. But these
complaints have been overshadowed by the underlying flaw in the
system-the imposition of "market-based" spot prices to determine
final contract price for electricity payable by utilities (UDCs) in a
context of supply scarcity. 16
The "transition" period noted above ends when a utility disposes of
all of its power generation assets. SDG&E was the first major utility to
do so. Other utilities have followed, and power generating companies

14. However, the rate reduction was accompanied by the issuance of "rate reduction bonds"
by the utilities to finance the reduction, and consumers were required to pay the borrowed money
back in another specially designated charge on the monthly bill called "trust transfer amount"
(TTA). The latter charge is greater than the rate cut (due to interest accumulation). In other
words, the rate reduction bonds were secured by a surcharge that substantially offset the facial
and advertised rate reduction.
15. A.B. 1890, 1996 Leg. (Cal. 1996) (Brulte).
16. Consumer advocates point to a 1996 decision by FERC as critical to the current
conundrum. During 1992-1995, the California Energy Commission had recommended the
development and stimulation of substantial alternative energy supply sources. This policy
decision was driven by several years of study of future energy supplies and by the long-run
advantage of developing renewable energy sources for future consumers in the millennia to come.
The recommendation would have produced 1.400 megawatts of power for a capacity cushion
which conservationists and consumer advocates argued was prudent. However, the utilities
appealed to FERC, arguing that some of the costs of this alternative generation would be higher
than the cheapest available power (generally hydro- and gas-powered generators). They
contended that utilities had a right to the lowest price sources, indeed, they argued that a failure to
pursue the lowest price could be "imprudent" under regulatory law standards and would subject
them to liability for the difference. FERC sided with the utilities, and the PUC's intended policy
of enhanced alternative generation capacity was substantially abandoned. Promoting Wholesale
Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public
Utilities, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, FERC Order
No. 888, 75 F.E.R.C. 61,080, 1996 FERC LEXIS 777 (1996).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

have now sold plants once considered "uneconomic" at an average of
three times their book value. 17 The utilities then generally restructured
themselves. The UDCs are now generally separate companies and are
subsidiaries of "parent companies" which have been allowed to retain
substantial interest in the subsidiaries' power-related assets. For
example, SDG&E's parent (Sempra Energy) retains substantial interests
in natural gas, a major source of electricity generation. SDG&E's rates
began to climb precipitously in 2000. As a result, the PUC froze billing
at 6.5 cents per kilowatt hour (slightly below the 7.2 cents paid by SCE
and 6.7 cents by PG&E). However, the agency pledged that the utility
would be able to collect from ratepayers the growing deficit between
that charge and the amount paid to generators for electricity. Moreover,
the 6.5-cent cap expires on December 31, 2003, and SDG&E is allowed
to apply for surcharges above that ceiling in the interim to moderate its
growing deficit.' 8 That deficit is now substantial, and it appears that the
most likely resolution will be the public bailout of this debt and
substantial additional debt as described in the chronology below.
* As noted above, the UDCs were subject to state regulation but
have a constitutional right to recovery of all "prudent costs." Energy
purchases became such a cost with deregulation. Hence, such costs
must be passed onto consumers within the state free from in-state
regulatory limitation. Only FERC maintained possible controls over
excessive maximum rates by power generators at the wholesale level.
That control was based on the right of FERC to place ceilings on such
rates where it found that "effective competition" did not exist and those
resulting rates were arbitrary and excessive. However, as indicated
above, FERC declined to impose meaningful limits close to reasonable
rate of return levels and only recently imposed a maximum lid (see
below).
* Although demand has not increased substantially from prior
years, supply contracted slightly during 1999 as utilities transitioned
off of power production. So-called "alternative generators" did not

17. Utilities received $28 billion in revenue through the sale of these assets. Note that power
generators are likely to recover their full investment in less than two years at current prices.
18. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Decision 99-05-051 (1999),
available at 1999 WL 1100923; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n Decision
00-08-021 (2000), available at 2000 WL 1341115; Order Instituting Investigation into the
Functioning of the Wholesale Electric Market, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Investigation 00-08-002
(2000), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov. Decision 00-08-021 was then superseded by A.B.
265 signed by the Governor on September 6, 2000, which then led to conforming California
Public Utilities Commission Decision 00-12-033 (2000) for industrial and commercial users. See
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov.
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increase as much as was anticipated (see above). A minor drought
lessened cheap hydroelectric power supply. Natural gas prices began
to climb, particularly after deregulation in California was
improvidently accompanied by reliance on monopoly or tight
oligopoly pipeline transmission.
* Meanwhile, the new system relied substantially not on long-term
contracted power, but on a "commodities market" type of structure,
where the ISO and the PX facilitated "spot" prices on a daily basis for
power purchased from the generators. The last highest price agreed
upon at the end of the day applied to previous "day ahead" transactions.
Moreover, little power was purchased in advance, with few long-term
contracts. The "day ahead" market yielded to a "real time" market
where prices were set hourly-with the last price each hour establishing
a "market clearing price" applicable to the previous transactions for that
hour. All generators would gain substantially from such high last
second prices.
Exacerbating the timing gamesmanship was the
segmentation of the power purchase "marked" into more than ten
separate auctions for different types of power (e.g., RMR or must run,
ancillary services, etc.). During this period several things happened.
First, about five generators (mostly Texas-based firms with interstate
operations) dominated energy production assets. Second, these
generators monitored the spot market results instantaneously via the
Internet. Third, generators began to take some power off the market,
purportedly without clear rationale.
* Due to the nature of the power market and the practices above,
spot prices began to climb to five, ten, and even one hundred times the
normal market level. Power purchased at $30 per megawatt-hour
jumped to $100, $300, and even $1,900. The typical pre-1999 price of
5 cents per kilowatt/hour jumped to 35 cents per kilowatt/hour overall
by January of 2001.
* Because of the prior sunk cost investment/low elasticity of
demand feature discussed above, and because of the "prior contract"
nature of the retail market, energy is purchased and provided based on
demand, regardless of the cost. That cost is then post hoc imposed on
the utilities and passed through to consumers without recourse.1 9 The
market may respond to high prices, but only after a time lag. That time
lag is substantial on the demand side, given the sunk cost already made
in electricity, and it is even more substantial on the supply side, given
19. Service has been purchased in advance and is relied upon by the customer. Moreover, the
utilities have a "common carrier" type of duty to provide power and are constitutionally entitled
to recovery of all prudent costs incurred.
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the lag factor in utility plant construction. Hence, the stage was set for
excessive prices without practical ceiling or limitation in the provision
of a basic and underlying service.
* The utilities publicly bemoaned the high prices, but channeled
substantial revenues away from their utility subsidiaries and into
competitive sector enterprise.
* The high prices led to enormous paper deficits for utilities, as the
rates charged customers had been calculated at previous energy
purchase levels and would have to be increased substantially to pay for
the debt now owed the power generators.
During and following these developments, public agencies and
officials responded. Although somewhat extensive, the full chronology
of that response emphasizes the gravity of the disruption and cost
flowing from the three deregulation errors cited above, particularly the
failure to predict or accommodate scarcity impact. The societal
response included legislation and litigation (including several cases
contending that the power generators have violated federal antitrust law
and committed acts of unfair competition in violation of the state's
Unfair Competition Law). It also led to the bankruptcy filing by one
utility, conservation incentives, public purchase of power through the
Department of Water Resources (at a rate of $50 million per day for a
substantial period of time), including long-term contracts to assure
supply at a predictable price, the possible public purchase of
transmission facilities of two utilities (including SDG&E) the public
pay-off of debts to the power generators, and the floating of substantial
public revenue bonds (almost $20 billion authorized); belated (limited)
rate ceilings imposed by FERC; and hearings on a limited refund due
California utilities from generator overcharges.
Most experts place the cost of the overcharges since 1999 at more
than $40 billion for each of the years 2000 and 2001, excluding the
indirect costs due to the expenditure of budget surpluses and the lack of
monies for general fund purposes otherwise available.
2. Post-2000: Who Let the Dogs Out?
The following chronology details the state's response to the energy
crisis as energy companies successfully gamed the bidding process to
double, and then double again, energy revenues.
1. In May 2000, wholesale prices began a general and steep climb,
particularly in San Diego, with SDG&E rates commonly doubling or
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tripling. The furor resulted in quick passage of A.B. 265,2o which
capped rates at 6.5 cents but promised later recovery for the utility of
deficits, as noted above. In July 2000, PG&E and Edison filed
emergency motions with the PUC seeking to sign long-term contracts
with power providers-and acknowledging
that earlier projections of
21
adequate supply were erroneous.
2. On November 29, 2000, consumer attorney Mike Aguirre filed
suit in San Diego Superior Court on behalf of a single ratepayer against
16 power generators (Hendricks v. Dynegy Power Marketing, Inc.,
GIC758565). Three similar suits were filed by San Diego County
Water Districts. These suits alleged violation of federal antitrust law
(Sherman Act section 1) prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade.
State legislators subsequently joined these suits. Initial removal to
federal court and motions to dismiss based on federal preemption were
denied.2 z
3. Through November 2000, Governor Davis and others appeared
before FERC, urging wholesale rate price caps. The agency rejected
these caps, suggesting instead that California utilities enter into longterm power contracts for price stability.
4. During December 2000, Governor Davis met in Washington,
23
D.C., with federal officials, arguing, once again, for price caps.
Energy Secretary Bill Richardson averted imminent rolling blackouts by
24
ordering twelve generating plants to sell power to PG&E and Edison.
(Some were refusing on the grounds that previous bills remained
unpaid.)
5. On January 4, 2001, PUC President Loretta Lynch reversed
direction and announced approval of a 10% rate hike for SCE and
25
PG&E customers.
6. On January 17, 2001, rolling blackouts were ordered in California
for the first time (aside from minor Bay Area blackouts in 1998).26

20. A.B. 265, ch. 328 (Cal. 2000) (Davis).
21. Citing Crisis, PUC Lets PG&E, SoCal Ed Seek Long-Term, Bilateral Contracts, ELEC.
UTIL. WK., Aug. 14, 2000, at 9, available at 2000 WL 13097908.
22. Hendricks v. Dynegy Power Mktg., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
23. See Federal Officials Put Some Electricity Under California's Control, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 30572112.
24. Cynthia Berthelsen & Lynda Gledhill, Energy Chief Steps In, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 14, 2000,
at A 1, available at 2000 WL 649904.
25. Carrie Peyton, PG&E Gets Rate Increase: California Regulators to Explore Long-Term
Solutions, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2835826.
26. See The California Energy Crisis: PG&E History, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at A14,
availableat 2001 WL 2476406.
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7. Also in January 2001, emergency legislation was enacted to allow
the state to purchase electricity through the Department of Water
Resources. 27 Meanwhile, natural gas shortages and excessive prices
became evident following improvident federal deregulation of natural
gas transmission.
8. Starting on January 18, 2001, California began buying power,
beginning with an appropriation of $400 million for an initial purchase
covering just twelve days. 28 Governor Davis began negotiations with
executives of the top four generators-Duke, Southern, Reliant, and
Dynegy-for long-term contracts. An auction for "long-term contracts"
was announced.2 9
9. Also on January 18, 2001, the City of San Francisco filed suit
against the thirteen major power producers, contending that they had
unlawfully colluded to manipulate the wholesale market.3 0 City
3
Attorney Louise Renne filed the action. 1
10. In January 2001, SCE and PG&E sued in federal court to compel
the PUC to grant them rate increases to pay for the higher energy costs
imposed upon them.3 2 (On May 4, 2001, the court refused to grant the
utility the proposed remedy, instead deferring to other agencies in
attempting to address the problem, including a federal bankruptcy judge
by then presiding over the PG&E bankruptcy.)
11. On February 5, 2001, Governor Davis seized the existing PG&E
33
and Edison energy contracts held by the California Power Exchange.
The Exchange (structured as an independent agency) then presented the
34
Governor with a bill for $1 billion, its valuation of the contracts taken.
These contracts provided for energy delivery at lower rates (6 cents to
35
13 cents per kilowatt/hour).
12. On February 6, the PUC announced that it was investigating
whether power utilities had violated Commission rules governing their

27. S.B. 7, 2001 Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (Burton).
28. See, e.g., Ed Mendel, Blackouts Spread in State: Emergency Aid Ok'd to Keep Utilities
Afloat, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 19, 2001, at Al, availableat 2001 WL 6438167.
29. Ed Mendel, State Will Take Bids for Electricity, Governor Hopes Web Auction Today
Reduces Prices, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 23, 2001, at A1, availableat 2001 WL 6438901.
30. People v. Dynegy Mktg. Inc., No. SCV318189 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (filed Jan. 18, 2001).
31. Id.
32. See PG&E v. Lynch, No. CV-01-1083, available at 2001 WL 840611 (C.D. Cal. May 4,
2001) (before U.S. District Judge Ronald Lew).
33. Emily Bazar & Dave Kasler, California Governor Uses Powers to Buy Emergency
Electricity, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 6, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 12167645.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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diversification into "unregulated" business. 36 All three had formed
parent holding companies since 1986 (PG&E formed PG&E
Corporation, SCE formed Edison International, and SDG&E formed
Sempra Energy). 37 A PUC audit found that almost all of the income of
the parents was traceable to utility profit.38 (Note that utilities are
designedly confined to cost recovery plus a "fair rate of return" on
"used and useful capital" committed to utility purposes.) The utilities
and their parent companies contend that these funds are unavailable to
them to pay for allegedly excessive power purchases-all of which
39
must be borne by ratepayers.
13. On February 8, 2001, the Governor announced special incentives
to bring new power plants on line. 40 The next day, Duke Energy gave
the Orange County Register an internal letter dated July 31, 2000 from
Duke president James Donnell offering 2,000 megawatts at 5 cents per
41
kilowatt/hour for five years.
14. On February 16, 2001, the Governor unveiled his overall "rescue
plan," which included the state purchase of utility transmission lines (to
pay off the massive deficits owed the utilities from taxpayer sourced
revenues).4 2 The price would range from $3 billion to $9 billion, an
amount that would be repaid, according to consumer critics, through
higher rates in the future. Also on this date, the Los Angeles Times
revealed that public power agencies had joined in charging wildly
43
excessive rates for the sale of their own excess power.
15. On February 20, 2001, the California Senate approved a measure
to create a state public power authority which could generate and sell
electricity itself. 44 The measure was thereafter enacted and authorized
$5 billion in general obligation revenue bonds to finance such plant
45
investment or conservation incentives.
36. Michael A. Hiltzik, PUC May Probe Utilities' Rule Compliance, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6,
2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2458707.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Mark Gladstone & Dion Nissenbaum, California Governor Speeds Approval Process for
New Power Plants, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12168179.
41. Kate Berry, California Governor Rejected Power-Contract Offer from Duke Energy Last
July, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 12168316.
42. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis Announces Recovery Plan for
State's Utilities (Feb. 16, 2001), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov.
43. Nancy Vogel & Richard Simon, The California Energy Crisis: DWP Earns Top Dollar
Selling Power, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A23, available at 2001 WL 2461646.
44. S.B. 6, 2001 Leg., 2d Ex. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (Burton).
45. Id.
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16. On February 22, 2001, the state announced it needed another
$500 million from surplus public funds for another ten days of energy
purchases, bringing the total to $2.3 billion in direct public money
purchases to that date.4 6 This sum does not include the billions of
dollars the generators claim they are owed from utilities.
17. On March 5, 2001, Governor Davis announced long-term energy
contracts with twenty suppliers. 47 The details were not disclosed.
However, a subsequent suit by the media to compel disclosure under the
California Public Records Act revealed costs to be at levels double to
triple historical prices, and included in some cases additional escalation
clauses based on the price of natural gas (which may rise precipitously
given evolving federal deregulation).4 8
18. On March 29, 2001, the PUC's Office of Ratepayer Advocates
accused SDG&E of padding electricity bills by $170 million. 49 The
utility had obtained below-market prices in a contract with Louisville
Gas & Electric, and-instead of passing on those reductions-charged
ratepayers at market levels and pocketed the difference for its
stockholders. 50 Hence, if costs are above established market level, the
utility expects ratepayers to pay; if below, it proposes to keep the
difference. The charges were made amidst the disclosure of a new
compensation package of $7 million for Stephen Baum, chairman of the
51
board of SDG&E's parent Sempra Energy.
19. On April 5, 2001, the PUC's Office of Ratepayer Advocates
charged that SDG&E failed to enter into long-term contracts when able
to do so during the previous year, costing ratepayers $98 million. 52 The
Office noted that SDG&E was in a position to overly rely on the shortterm "spot market" which hit extraordinarily high levels in late 2000. 53

46. Jenifer Warren, Secrecy Cloaks State's Buyers on Their Prowlfor Power Electricity, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2463953.
47. Dan Morain & Nancy Vogel, Electricity Deals Could Supply 7 Million Homes, Davis
Says, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2467355.
48. Dan Morain, Concern over Price of Long-Term Power Pacts Grows, L.A. TIMES, July 9,
2001, at B7, available at 2001 WL 2501762; California Officials Release Power Contracts,
GENERATION WK., July 11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 8447408.
49. Craig D. Rose, State Watchdog Accuses SDG&E of Padding Bills, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Mar. 29, 2001, at A1, availableat 2001 WL 6450815.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Craig D. Rose, Report Faults SDG&E on Contracts,SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 6,
2001, at A26, availableat 2001 WL 6452400.
53. Nancy Vogel, Cal-ISO Predicts 34 Days of Blackouts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, at A26,
available at 2001 WL 2476067.
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20. On April 6, 2001, PG&E surprised public officials by declaring
bankruptcy, seeking protection of the federal court and compelling
from ratepayers of monies allegedly due the power
payment 54
generators.
21. On April 9, 2001, Governor Davis and Southern California
Edison agreed in principle on the state purchase of the utility's 32,000
miles of transmission lines for $2.76 billion. 55 As part of the deal,
Edison's parent agreed to refund to the utility some $420 million in
generators to help pay some of
profit from its plant sales to the power
56
generators.
those
to
owed
"debt"
the
22. On April 21, 2001, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors
announced plans for state legislation to authorize a municipal utility
district to generate and sell electricity. 57 Los Angeles, Sacramento, and
San Francisco currently have such districts. Interestingly, Sempra
Energy expressed public support for the concept. On May 22, the
following intense
measure was killed in an Assembly Committee
58
Energy.
Sempra
from
opposition
behind-the-scenes
23. On April 24, 2001, the state announced public expenditures of
$5.1 billion for electricity purchases from January to April, all in
addition to current amounts allegedly owed energy producers by
59
utilities.
24. On May 1, 2001, FERC ordered a small energy producer
(Williams Energy Marketing & Trading of Tulsa) to pay an $8 million
refund to the ISO. 6° Williams markets power produced in California by
AES Corporation of Arlington, Virginia. The refund was ordered
because Williams allegedly took plants off-line improperly, thereby
artificially limiting supply resulting in excessive charges. Similar
problems were alleged as to other producers who facilitated $550
million in overcharges beyond a $150/mega-watt hours "breakpoint."
54. Tim Reiterman, Dan Morain & Mitchell Landsberg, PG&E Declares Bankruptcy; State's
Crisis Plan Collapse, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7,2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2476433.
55. Miguel Bustillo & Nancy Vogel, Failure to Buy Entire Network May Doom Davis' Power
Deal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 2477741.
56. Dan Morain & Robin Fields, Davis Arranges to Buy Edison's Share of Grid Power, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 2001, at AI, available at 2001 WL 2477198.
57. Ed Mendel, County Wants to Create Own Utility District, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr.
21, 2001, at B 1, available at 2001 WL 6455538.
58. Bill Ainsworth, Panel Pulls the Plug on County Utility Plan, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
May 22, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 6461964.
59. Miguel Bastillo & Dan Morain, State Spends $5.1 Billion on Power Budget, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 2481105.
60. AES Southland, Inc., Docket No. IN01-3-001, 95 F.E.R.C. T 61,167, 2001 FERC LEXIS
973 (2001).
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That upper limit is more than ten times wholesale energy prices prior to
2001.61
25. On May 2, 2001, Duke Energy proposed a settlement of its
financial claims to Governor Davis, including a request to dismiss all
pending litigation. 62 In addition to Duke's operation of the South Bay
plant in San Diego, it also purchased two large power plants from
PG&E at Morro Bay and Moss Landing in 1998 for $611 million and
announced its intention to spend another $1.6 billion to expand and
modernize them. 63 Duke offered to expand its capacity and accept some
discount on monies owed to it if suits were dismissed and investigations
terminated. 64
26. Also on May 2, 2001, Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante
filed suit against the major five power producers in Los Angeles
Superior Court, contending that they (and fourteen named executives)
violated federal and state antitrust laws in conspiring to fix prices and
supplies of power for California sale. 65 Duke Energy was among those
named.6 6 Mike Aguirre of San Diego (who brought Hendricks, the
consumer class action in San Diego described above 67) is Bustamante's
attorney.
27. On May 13, 2001, a report by FERC staff expert economist
Jonathan Ogur found that El Paso Corporation was artificially inflating
natural gas prices through its dominance of the only pipeline into
Southern California. 68 The report estimated that California had already
paid an extra $3.8 billion from March 1, 2000 to March 31, 2001.69 In
testimony on April 19, experts from the Batelle Institute charged that
PG&E had mysteriously relinquished its natural gas allocated space on
El Paso pipelines into California, which were then relegated back to El
Paso, which in turn assigned them to Dynegy, Inc., one of the five major

61. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Order Directing Sellers to Provide Refunds of Excess
Amounts Charged, 94 F.E.R.C. 61,245 at Attachment A, 2001 FERC LEXIS 463 (2001).
62. Nancy Vogel et al., Big Energy Firm Seeks Deal with State to End Suits, L.A. TIMES, May
2, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2483549.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Bustamante v. Dynegy, No. BC249705 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (filed May 2, 2001), availableat
http://www.Itg.ca.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2001/prO5020 .asp.
66. Id.
67. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
68. Bernadette Tansey, Expert Says Market Probably Fixed, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 2001, at
Al, availableat 2001 WL 3403582.
69. See id.
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energy producers for California. 70 That capacity is important because a
large part of electricity generation comes from natural gas-fired power
plants. The experts testified that Dynegy did not use the capacity then
assigned to it, foreclosing natural gas supplies from the state's energy
producers and driving up gas prices, which in turn artificially drove up
spot electricity prices to the massive benefit of the company and its
fellow power generators. 7 1 The manipulation drove natural gas prices
to twelve times the price being charged in Texas. 72 Two cases were
filed in May and June 2001 against natural gas concerns alleging
antitrust violations based on these developments: Berg v. Southern
California
Gas Co. and City of Los Angeles v. Southern California Gas
3
Co.

7

28. On May 15, 2001, the PUC voted three to two to increase rates to
residential ratepayers of PG&E by 55%, to 22 cents per kilowatt-hour
(from a high 14.3 cents).74 SCE consumer rates increased by 47%
(beyond 130% of the low baseline).7 5 Industrial and other rates were
raised a similar amount. The total rate hike was calculated to generate
76
an additional $5.7 billion over previous levels.
29. On May 17, 2001, FERC issued an order to help "qualifying
facilities" (energy producers that provide power through alternative
energy means at somewhat higher prices and account for an important
10% to 15% of energy used).77 The move was denounced by Governor
Davis as undermining his attempt to negotiate a long-term arrangement
with the QFs. 78 These producers are allegedly owed $1.5 billion by the
utilities and are not being paid. 79 The Governor contended that the
policy of FERC will lead California to continue its reliance on spot
80
prices at ten to twenty times otherwise obtainable levels.

70. See Miguel Bastillo & Julie Tamaki, Texas Energy Firm Gouged California, Experts Say,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 2479748.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. In re California Retail Gas & Elec. Antitrust Litigation, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1055 (D.
Nev. 2001) (consolidating cases originally filed in the California Superior Courts).
74. See Press Release, CPUC Sets New Electric Rates for PG&E & Edison Customers, (May
15, 2001), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUBLISHED/NEWS_RELEASE/7171 .htm.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Cogen Lyondell, Inc., 95 F.E.R.C. 61,243, 2001 FERC LEXIS 1161 (2001).
78. Megan Garvey, The Energy Crisis: FERC Issues Power Ruling, L.A. TIMES, May 17,
2001, at A20, availableat 2001 WL 2487615.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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30. Also on May 17, Attorney General Bill Lockyer filed suit in San
Francisco Superior Court to compel three energy companies to produce
documents demanded by the Attorney General under his Government
Code prefiling Unfair Competition Law powers.8 ' Lockyer had asked
for ninety-one categories of documents and the out-of-state companies
had refused to produce them, objecting to each request as "vague,
ambiguous, and unintelligible."8 2 They sent some documents to the
Attorney General as a show of good faith, but objected to a large
proportion of the documents requested.8 3 The objecting companies
included Reliant, Dynegy, and Mirant. 84 The Attorney General pledged
to keep obtained documents "confidential" vis-a-vis the Department of
Water Resources, competitors, and entities with which the producers
85
had to negotiate prices or contracts.
31. Also on May 17, the Governor announced the creation of the
California Consumer Power and Conservation Financing Authority
empowered to float up to $5 billion in general revenue bonds for power
generation/conservation purposes.8 6 The Authority not only has the
authority to build plants, but to seize them where necessary to assure
adequate energy (subject to just compensation payment).
32. On May 22, 2001, the PUC announced that it had evidence from
service records compiled by the ISO that some generators were
withholding power which led to Stage 1, 2, and 3 alerts (as well as
extremely high spot prices). 87 General Counsel Gary Cohen indicated
that the case was buttressed by three Duke Energy employee
whistleblowers.
33. On May 23, 2001, the PG&E bankruptcy judge refused to order
rate increases to pay the utility's alleged debt to power generators,
instead deferring to the constitutional authority of the PUC. 88 His order
became final on June 1, 2001. He also barred representatives of
ratepayers from the proceedings as parties or interested creditors.
81. See Robert Salladay, Subpoenaed Documents Withheld, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 2001, at
A14, availableat 2001 WL 3403776.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See State to Run Power Plants to Ease CaliforniaCrunch, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
May 17, 2001, at A6, available at 2001 WL 19786941; see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text (referring to authorizing legislation).
87. Brandon Bailey & Chris O'Brien, California Regulators Say Companies Pushed Up Price
of Power, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 25, 2001, available at 2001 WL 21907989.
88. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n (In re Pacific Gas & Elec.), 263 B.R. 306,
309 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001).
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34. Also on May 23, legislative Democrats filed suit against FERC
to compel the imposition of wholesale price ceilings (contending that
FERC's refusal to do so under the existing federal statute constitutes an
"abuse of discretion"). 89 The suit was filed by well-known plaintiffs'
attorney Joseph Cotchett on behalf of Senate President pro tempore
John Burton and Assembly Speaker Robert Hertzberg directly before
the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco,
which has direct jurisdiction over FERC. 90 Joining Cotchett was Clark
Kelso, a professor at McGeorge Law School who recently served as
interim Insurance Commissioner. 9 1 On May 30, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the suit, declining to hear it. 92 The Federal Power Act requires
such challengers to first exhaust administrative remedies, which here
would include a request to FERC for reconsideration, which had not
been brought.
35. On May 25, 2001, the Governor issued Executive Order D-36-01
instructing the Department of Water Resources (DWR) to implement
the conservation measures of then recently enacted SBX1 5 and ABX1
29 and ordering the California Energy Commission to coordinate the
permitting, siting, finance, design, and construction of new power
plants. 93 The Order authorized spending from the state's Disaster
Response-Emergency Order Account for these and related purposes.
Under the Order, the contracts entered into by these agencies (including
DWR energy purchases) were purportedly exempt from the competitive
bidding and other mandatory safeguards normally applicable to public
purchasing under the Government Code. The Order also allegedly
conferred "retroactive legitimacy" on all such contracts entered into
after January 17, 2001 and prior to the Order.
36. On June 1, 2001, the Governor announced his intention to ask
FERC to recognize the ISO as a "regional transmission organization"
under federal law. That status was required by FERC in order to
maintain its limited $250 per megawatt-hour "cap" on wholesale rates,
94
and subjects the state agency to additional federal controls.

89. See Emily Bazar, California Loses Round in Fight for Federal Energy-Price Caps,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 21909474.
90. See Dan Morain, Veteran Lawyer Joins Campaign for Price Controls, L.A. TIMES, May
23, 2001, at B7, available at 2001 WL 2489292.
9 1. See id.
92. See Bazar, supra note 89.
93. S.B. 5, 2001 Gen. Assem., 1st Ex. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (Sher); A.B. 29, 2001 Gen. Assem.,
1st Ex. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (Kehoe).
94. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Order Establishing Prospective Mitigation and
Monitoring Plan, 95 F.E.R.C. T 61,115 (2001).
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37. Also on June 1, the Governor announced implementation of his
"20-20" incentive plan for conservation. Consumers who reduce power
usage by more than 20% from a year ago will receive a 20% reduction
95
on their electricity bill, starting in July.
38. Finally, on June 1, 2001, Duke Energy confirmed that its January
2001 charges for electricity included charges of $3,880 per megawatthour, about 100 times normal market levels, and a new record.96 The
sales occurred just before the state stepped in through the DWR to take
over energy purchases for the state. On average, Duke charged $136
per megawatt-hour in California during January, just over four times
previous market levels. 97 Duke cited the skyrocketing cost of natural
gas as a factor. 98 (But those increases accounted for a small portion of
the price hikes, and most of Duke's plants can switch within hours from
gas to oil.)
99
39. On June 5, 2001, SDG&E requested substantial rate hikes.
(Although rates are theoretically frozen through 2003, it has the right to
seek "surcharges for higher electricity prices," as discussed above). It
sought to collect $915 million to pay for energy it has used that was
purchased after January by the state DWR. l°°
40. Also on June 5, the state Senate Rules Committee issued
subpoenas to eight out-of-state power generators and asked for
information from DWR and the Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power.101
41. On June 6, 2001, Williams Energy Services disclosed that it is
the target of a United States Department of Justice investigation into
possible supply fixing with AES Southland to not build additional
02
power plants in California in order to keep supply diminished. 1
42. On June 7, 2001, United States Senator Diane Feinstein
introduced legislation to re-regulate energy, specifying that wholesale

95. Davis Announces Rebates for Summer Power Savers, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at N1,
availableat 2001 WL 6053373.
96. Christian Berthelsen, Duke Admits Overcharging Utilities, S.F. CHRON., June 2, 2001, at
B1, available at 2001 WL 3405252.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Anne C. Mulkern, SDG&E to Seek Rate Hike to Cover $915 Million Tab, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., June 5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 9674714.
100. See id.
101. Carl Ingram & Miguel Bustillo, Panel OKs Subpoenas for Energy Companies, L.A.
TIMES, June 5, 2001, at B 1, available at 2001 WL 2492815.
102. Peter Behr, Justice Probes AES's Electricity Deal, WASH. POST, June 6, 2001, at Al 1,
availableat 2001 WL 17633741.
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rates would be capped at "cost of production plus a fair rate of return"
plant by plant. 10 3 The bill is not expected to pass.
43. By June 8, 2001, spot prices had fallen to a level making the
long-term contracts entered into by Governor Davis 10 4 a costly bargain
for ratepayers. Spot prices were then substantially below the price
agreed to in 23 of the 38 long-term contracts entered into by the DWR,
many negotiated during the height of scarcity pressure and bafflingly
applicable for terms of ten years and more. During 1999, prices were in
the $40 per megawatt-hour area. During late 2000 and early 2001, they
reached extraordinary and extreme levels of over $300 per megawatthour. By June 8, peak prices slipped to about $70 per megawatt-hour,
with contracts for July delivery at about $175.
44. On June 12, 2001, the Assembly Judiciary Committee passed a
bill originally proposed on May 21, 2001 by Assembly member Juan
Vargas of San Diego. The bill proposed a partial takeover plan,
authorizing state takeover of power plants in the state on a temporary
basis, to be returned to previous owners upon payment of a rental
charge. 10 5 After passing through the Assembly Judiciary Committee, it
06
was later sidetracked. 1
45. On June 13, 2001, Attorney General Bill Lockyer announced via
press release the convening of a criminal grand jury to investigate
whether power generators were manipulating supply and prices. 10 7 (It is
unclear why a prosecutor would publicly announce the convening of a
criminal grand jury, which by its very nature is intended to be a secret
proceeding.)
46. On June 18, 2001, the Governor announced a tentative agreement
to buy SDG&E's transmission lines for $1 billion, 2.3 times their net
book value. 10 8 The deal would include apparent utility satisfaction of
the $750 million claimed by power generators' 0 9 (the difference
between SDG&E rates and power purchases over the last year). The

103. Richard Simon, Senator Fires Warning Shot on Power Costs, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2001,
at Al, availableat 2001 WL 2493485.
104. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
105. Bill Ainsworth, Temporary Takeovers to be Spelled Out in Bill, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., June 12, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 6466146.
106. A.B. 35, 2001 Gen. Assem., 2d Ex. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (Vargas).
107. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General Statement on
Convening Criminal Grand Jury to Investigate Energy Pricing Practices (June 13, 2001), at
http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts.
108. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis Announces Agreement with
SDG&E, Sempra Energy (June 18, 2001), at http://www.govemor.ca.gov.
109. Id.
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PUC Office of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA) summarized the
Memorandum of Understanding's (MOU) key provisions: (a) 100% of
the gain on this sale would go to utility stockholders, (b) elimination of
the $750 million shortfall account, with SDG&E writing off $319
million, and (c) agreement to price at cost for SDG&E's remaining
energy generating facilities for ten years1 l l
The ORA openly
questioned the wisdom of paying $1 billion in public money to acquire
transmission lines. The office argued that these funds would be better
spent adding generating capacity-the lack of which results in scarcity
and inflated prices.' 11 If the state were to ever sell those lines, it would
obtain only a fraction of the purchase price, creating a substantial
2
taxpayer loss."1
47. On June 19, 2001, FERC announced more extensive price caps
on wholesale power sold in California. The caps were set at a level to
allow profit for the "least efficient" energy producer in order to
"provide incentive to much more efficient producers to expand." The
order banned "megawatt laundering" whereby generators had been
transmitting power out of state, and then importing it back into
California under different auspices to achieve high prices. Importantly,
the FERC order required all generators that transmit power to the
California grid to "sell what they have available" when the state's ISO
requests power. Although this ceiling eliminates the spectacular $1,900
per megawatt-hour charges, it allows overall prices at three to four
times historical levels. Moreover, California is assessed, on top of
"least efficient plant" ceilings, a 10% surcharge because of the "credit
uncertainty" of its utilities. 113
48. On June 22, 2001, three of the "whistleblowers" who had
provided information to the PUC surfaced publicly."14 All three were
Duke Energy employees working at the utility's Chula Vista plant:
Glenn Johnson, Jimmy Olkjer, and Ed Edwards. 115 The three testified
before the state Senate that they had been ordered to engage in
110. Analysis and Comments of the Office of Ratepayer Advocates on the Memorandum of
Understanding by and Among California Department of Water Resources, San Diego Gas &
Electric Company and Sempra (July 18, 2001), at http://www.ora.ca.gov.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., Order on Rehearing of Monitoring and Mitigation Plan,
FERC Docket No. ELOO-95-031, at 35 (June 19, 2001).
114. Kimberly Kindy, Three Say Company Purposely Cut Power, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
June 22, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 9676471.
115. See Operation and Maintenance of Generation Facilities,Hearing Before the California
Senate Select Committee to Investigate Price Manipulation of the Wholesale Energy Market (Cal.
2001) passim.
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unnecessary maintenance and in the ramping down of supply without
justification in order to allow Duke to take advantage of high spot
prices. 1 16
The employees contended that the supply diminution
included idling some units entirely and throwing away unused
equipment that could be used to enhance capacity. 117 They all worked
as contract employees until April 2001. The testimony included the
presentation of a "control room log" by Olkjer (a former control room
operator), indicating the reduction of output minutes before a Stage 3
alert.118
49. On June 26 and 27, 2001, Duke Energy purchased full-page
newspaper ads disputing the claims of its three former employees. In
the ads, Duke Energy contended that the "ramping up and ramping
down" supply decisions are made by the ISO, to which the employees
complaining were not privy.' 19 On July 2, 2001, the ISO confirmed
parts of Duke's explanation pertaining to instantaneous ramping up and
ramping down. 120 However, the explanation did not address the
employees' description of longer-range capacity reduction decisions,
including disposal of repair parts capable of generating power and
gratuitous removal of equipment from the line for disingenuous
"maintenance."
50. On June 26, 2001, California officials asked for $8.9 billion in
refunds from energy producers at the first settlement conference on the
state's complaint for redress before FERC. 12 1 The state's ISO presented
back-up to justify the refund, claiming the following overcharges:
Williams Cos. - $861 million
Duke Energy - $805 million
Mirant Corp. - $784 million
Reliant Energy - $750 million
Dynegy, Inc. - $530 million.
FERC Chief Judge Curtis Wagner indicated that total refunds would
not top $2.5 billion.' 22 Note that $3 billion of the claimed overcharges

116. Id. passim.
117. Id. passim.
118. Id. at 115-249.
119. Duke Places Print Ads to Attack Workers' Allegations, HOUSTON CHRON., June 27,
2001, at 4, available at 2001 WL 23610678.
120. Kate Berry, ISO: Duke Was Just Following Orders, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 2,
2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 9677069.
121. Jim Puzzanghera, rower Companies Debate Amounts of California Refunds, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, June 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23529818.
122. See id.
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occurred prior to October 1, 2000, which FERC claims is the starting
point of its authority to investigate pricing abuses. In response, Senator
Barbara Boxer introduced legislation authorizing FERC to order refunds
123
back to July 2000 when the SDG&E rate increases started.
Administrative Law Judge Wagner later opined that the refund was
unlikely to exceed $1 billion, adopting a set of rules disqualifying 80%
24
of the California claim. 1
51. On June 26, 2001, two new appointees to FERC-Pat Wood and
Nora Brownell-visited California, reiterating confidence in
125
deregulation but promising to have an open mind.
52. On June 26, 2001, the State borrowed $4.3 billion from its own
general fund to pay for DWR power purchases, with repayment
dependent upon the floating of a mammoth $13.4 billion general
revenue bond planned for September. 126 The $4.3 billion brought the
general fund draw to $6.2 billion before the end of fiscal year
2000-2001.127 Virtually all general fund increases, including a "highest
priority" Assembly Democrat promise of $330 million for foster care
children in need, were suspended. Bills requiring new spending,
particularly for children, were terminated by referral to the "suspense
files" of the two appropriations committees, allowing their elimination
without public negative vote. The bond obligation would be the largest
ever floated and will obligate the state to pay interest over the next 15
years, 128 which will affect its general revenue bond capacity and reduce
general fund revenues due to the tax exempt status of interest paid out.
53. On July 2, 2001, Governor Davis announced the opening of the
540-megawatt Sutter Energy Project, the largest new power plant since
1976.129 On the same day, the Senate Rules Committee approved a
non-binding resolution supporting a gubernatorial decision to "seize
power plants" in California in order to stop pricing abuses by the five
30
out-of-state headquartered generators.'

123. Richard Simon, Davis Asks for Energy Refund Help Power, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2001,
at Al, available at 2001 WL 2497185.
124. See, e.g., California Rate-Refund Request is Curtailed, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at
A12, available at 2001 WL 24677875.
125. See Puzzanghera, supra note 121.
126. Ed Mendel, State Gets $4.3 Billion Loan to Buy Energy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June
27, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 6469071.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Jim Herron Zamora, Scorching Weather Triggers Stage 2 Alert, Price Caps, S.F.
CHRON., July 3, 2001, at A3, available at 2001 WL 3408014.
130. Carl Ingram, Senate Panel's Resolution Backs Power Plant Seizures, L.A. TIMES,
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54. On July 2, 2001, State Controller Kathleen Connell released
previously secret elements of the Governor's forty-one long-term
electricity contracts, contending that the costs may be substantially
higher than the administration's $43 billion estimate. 13 1 The provisions
were released after a media suit resulted in a court order declaring them
to be public documents and countermanding the Governor's order to
maintain them in confidence. 132 The contracts appear to allow for
prices in the $70 to $200 per megawatt-hour range, substantially above
previous market levels or prices necessary to provide a fair rate of
return. 133 In addition, some contracts included pass-through escalator
provisions for natural gas increases. 134 The Los Angeles Times reported
that the average cost of power under the contracts to July was $173 per
megawatt-hour, while recent spot prices were falling to as low as
$50.13' The Times also reported that "outside consultants" had been
paid $2.8 million by late June to advise the administration and to engage
136
in public relations-related work.
55. On July 18, 2001, a proposed agreement between the PUC and
DWR was announced. 137 Under its terms, DWR would be guaranteed
full ratepayer recovery of all state power purchases it arranged. 138 The
cost of bonds and interest needed to repay the general fund for prior
public purchases, and monies still owed and to be owed to the utilities,
would be automatically imposed on ratepayers without hearing or
further consideration by the PUC. 139 The proposal followed the
enactment of AB IX in February 2001, giving DWR authority to
"recover its costs" and directing an agreement between it and the PUC
to accomplish that recovery.
The new arrangement alters the
longstanding state constitutionally specified role of the PUC as the
regulator of private utilities. It is unsettled whether the agency can
delegate such an exclusive grant of power to another entity. This
specific delegation would be not to an independent agency, but to a

July 3, 2001, at BI0, available at 2001 WL 2500510.
131. Rich Connell et al., The Energy Crisis: Hidden Costs Revealed in Power Pacts, L.A.
TIMES, July 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2500550.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Mary Ann Milbourn, Ratepayers Pay Brunt of PUC Plan, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July
19, 2001, at K, available at 2001 WL 9678790.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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"department" whose director serves at the pleasure of the Governor.
Supporters contend that assurance of repayment is needed for bond
issuance to repay the general fund and keep utilities solvent and that
DWR serves as a public agency check over private utilities in lieu of the
PUC.
56. On July 27, 2001, Governor Davis issued a press release
reaffirming his commitment to renewable energy, and setting as a goal
increasing its share of total energy production from its current 12% to
17% by 2006.140
57. On July 28, 2001, The Los Angeles Times reported that state
spending on consultants was budgeted at $25 million. 14 1 The Davis
administration disclosed that it fired five of its energy consultants for
conflicts of interest. 14 2 A sixth resigned. 143 Four of the consultants
served as "traders" facilitating state purchases from energy firms,
including Calpine Corporation, a San Jose-based power generator that
landed the largest share of the $43 billion in long-term contracts
All four were also Calpine
criticized for excessive prices. 144
stockholders, some in amounts over $100,000.145 These dismissals
followed asset disclosures required under state law. 14 6 However, the
Governor's advisers include others, including executives Joseph Fichera
and Michael Hoffman, who have not disclosed their holdings and who
the Governor contends need not do so. 14 7 California Common Cause
of these
Director Jim Knox characterized the Governor's exclusion
14 8
law.
the
to
contrary
as
obligations
disclosure
from
advisers
The San Jose Mercury News revealed the continuing and close
relationship between the Governor and John Bryson of Southern
California Edison. 149 Edison was a chief backer of the 1996
deregulation scheme and expended more than $31 million in lobbying

140. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis Endorses Plan to Increase
Renewable Electricity Generation (July 27, 2001), at http://www.govemor.ca.gov/state/govsite/
gov-homepage.jsp.
141. Jeffrey L. Rabin, 5 State Energy Advisors Fired Over Conflict Ethics, L.A. TIMES, July
28, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 2506292.
142. Id.; see also notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
143. Rabin, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. John Woolfolk et al., Many of CaliforniaGovernor's Top Hires Have Ties to Utility, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 5, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 25949835.
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and campaign contributions during this period.1 50 From 1995 to 2000,
Edison contributed more than $350,000 to Davis, more than the
$260,000 received from the five power generators or the $290,000
received from the other two utilities: PG&E and SDG&E. 15 1 The
Governor appointed Carl Wood, a former Edison and union official, to
52 He used Michael
the PUC.1
Peevey of Southern California Edison (its
president through the early 1990s) as an unpaid consultant to negotiate
utility rescue plans. 153 He hired the Electricity Power Group, a
consulting firm of former Edison officials, on a $6.2 million contract
through 2002 to oversee the state's power purchasing and generation
strategy. 154 The Mercury News reported that Group director Vikram
Budhraja purchased between $10,000 to $100,000 of Edison stock and
sold it at a profit at the time his contract started. 155 The Governor also
hired Larry Hamlin, who oversaw Edison's power plants, to serve as his
"energy construction czar." 156 Hamlin took a "leave of absence" from
his Edison position, which he has since rejoined. 157 One of Edison's
158
plants qualified for a $1 million bonus under Hamlin's plan.
The media disclosed that the Governor, in order to sell his plan to the
public, also hired public relations firms that had previously worked
under contract with Edison, including Mark Fabiani and Chris
Lehane.

159

58. On August 1, 2001, a coalition of consumer groups released a
report highly critical of the Davis-Sempra pact to pay off the $750
million in debt claimed by SDG&E from its high energy costs.1 60 The
groups presented substantial evidence of utility concealment of $450
million in utility profits diverted to its parent. Part of the alleged
"accounting evasion" involved $120 million in profits obtained from
some generating assets SDG&E had retained post-deregulation. While
paying high utility costs, SDG&E also was selling power at the very

150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. id.
160. Craig D. Rose, Customers' Huge 'Debt' to SDG&E Called Sham, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 30, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 6475513, see also notes 108-12 and
accompanying text.
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high rates extant. SDG&E contended that the two were separate
accounts and it could assess ratepayers the full amount of higher
charges paid, while collecting for itself (its stockholders) the full
amount of revenues obtained for its power sold at those prices. The
consumer groups joined the PUC's Office of Ratepayer Advocates in
decrying the purchase of SDG&E transmission lines at 2.3 times book
value as a means to "bail out" the utility at taxpayer expense, while
burdening the state with transmission line obligations. In addition, the
advocates criticized the quid pro quo provision of the MOU that
SDG&E would pay $100 million and the state would end its
investigation and terminate any further objection to the utility
purchasing practices in paying many times previous market levels for
power. That concession of over hundreds of millions in purported
overcharges was significant because utilities are compensated for only
"prudent" costs incurred. Failure to obtain long-term contracts and to
otherwise become victims of spot price excess to the degree extant
poses a challenge to "prudent purchase" status necessary for ratepayer
assessment.
59. On August 9, 2001, the DWR announced its refusal to let energy
regulators review its costs. 16 1 The DWR's July bill for $12.3 billion for
energy it had purchased since assuming responsibility was to be
recovered by ratepayers. The utilities that had to raise rates for that
payment asked the PUC to allow cross-examination and open hearing
on the DWR purchases, contending that the PUC is empowered by the
state constitution to protect ratepayers. 162 That obligation arguably
requires examination of charges to be paid by those ratepayers.
60. On August 13, 2001, the Governor named his four appointees to
the new California Power Authority, joining State Treasurer Phil
163
Angelides on the five-person Board (see #31 above).
61. On August 28, 2001, the PUC proposed shifting $500 million of
the monies owed by Southern California Edison to PG&E (in
bankruptcy) over the next two years. 164 The decision rested on a

161. Michael Bazeley, California's Power Buyer Refuses to Disclose Costs, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 9, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25951152.
162. Id.
163. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Davis Appoints Members to the
Consumer Power and Conservation Financing Authority Board of Directors (Aug. 13, 2001),
available at http://www.governor.ca.gov,
164. Nancy Vogel & Tim Reiterman, The State PG&E's Power Bill May Go Up, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2001, at B8, availableat 2001 WL 2513585.
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recalculation of the actual costs incurred by SCE versus PG&E for
65
DWR-purchased power.1
The agency also issued a draft decision for another increase for
SDG&E ratepayers-at an average of 12%.166 However, the first small
increment of power was increased less; small commercial customers
incurred an average 18% hike. 16 7 The decision was subsequently
68
adopted.'
Related orders issued by the PUC acceded to the jurisdiction of DWR
to pass through rate increases as necessary to pay for its energy
purchases without PUC review. Hence, the bonds to be issued for
utility bailout would be marketable given the assured ratepayer
assessment for their full cost.
62. On August 29, 2001, consumer advocate Harvey Rosenfield
"declared war" on the revised Southern California Edison relief
legislation, SBX2 78 (Polanco). 169 Rosenfield rented a suite of rooms at
a Sacramento hotel, outfitted his colleagues with yellow "Bailout
Watch" armbands, and set up a combat information center "war room"
to manage the lobbying against the measure. 170 Declaring his group at
"Defcon 1" and prepared "to go to war to protect our pocketbooks,"
Rosenfield brought additional attention to the issue, and the legislation
was subsequently defeated in the state Senate on September 15, 2001.171
63. On September 9, 2001, the San Jose Mercury News released its
own investigation (using outside expert assistance) of the Governor's
long-term power purchases, concluding that the prices were
substantially above those likely in future years. 172 Quoted experts
estimated that peak demand prices would be $36 per megawatt-hour in
2003, while the contracts obligated an average of $81 per megawatthour for that year. 73 The state has currently obligated itself to pay an
average of $70 per megawatt hour over the next ten years.174 The long-

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Kate Berry, SDG&E Rates Jumping 12%, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 21, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 9684615.
169. Dion Nissenbaum, Activists, Lobbyists Besiege California Lawmakers over EnergyRescue Deal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26628795.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Eric Nalder et al., Power Deals Under Fire, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 9, 2001, at
IA, available at LEXIS, Knight Ridder Tribune News Service.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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term contracts, negotiated at the nadir of state bargaining power,
commit the state to spend $43 billion through 2020.175
64. On September 14, 2001, the legislature enacted a bill to set aside
a portion of existing rate revenues to repay bonds issued by DWR. It
would also limit bonds to electricity purchases and related costs, and the
claims would be publicly reviewed by the PUC to ensure that incurred
costs are "fair and reasonable." However, the PUC review will be
primarily cosmetic, bound by an obligation to act within a short (thirty
day) period.
65. On September 20, 2001, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals issued its decision in Duke Energy Trading & Marketing,
L.L.C. v. Davis. 17 6 The court held that the Governor's earlier "seizure"
of long-term contracts obligating energy companies to provide power at
specified prices for state use to mitigate the scarcity problem facing the
state was preempted by the statutory authority of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. 177
Justice Kozinski's dissent argued
unsuccessfully that precedent allows a sovereign state to capture such
assets where emergency conditions dictate. 178 The decision, if not
altered by the United States Supreme Court, could limit California's
options to either control energy prices or restore assured supply, and
could place the state at the purportedly untender mercies of FERC.
66. Also on September 20, 2001, PG&E announced its proposed
bankruptcy reorganization plan. 179 The proposal would repay energy
creditors in full but allow PG&E to escape further regulatory
controls. 180 The plan would divide utility operations between PG&E
and its parent company, with the latter exempt from regulatory
oversight. 181 The parent would assume control of lucrative gas and
electricity transmission lines (with their concomitant monopoly power);
in addition, hydroelectric facilities and the Diablo Canyon Nuclear
Power Plant would move to the unregulated side of the parent's
operations. The scheme is designed to satisfy creditors-a traditional
prime concern of bankruptcy proceedings. At the same time, it would
achieve unregulated status for valuable assets, including much of the
175. Id.
176. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2001).
177. Id. at 1058.
178. Id. at 1059 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261
(1997)).
179. Press Release, Pacific Gas & Electric Company and PG&E Corporation File Plan of
Reorganization (Sept. 20, 2001), at http://www.pge.corn006 news/006anewsre/010920.shtml.
180. See id.
181. See id.
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monopoly loop justifying maximum rate regulation. The plan is
supported by the energy company creditors who would be paid in full
under the plan.182 It may also be a possible resolution given the primary
bankruptcy concern of creditor repayment. However, it is unclear how
a regulated monopoly can be removed from PUC jurisdiction without
statutory and state constitutional change.
67. On September 21, 2001, the PUC suspended by a three to two
vote the "customer choice" element of deregulation. 183 A critical
component, such "direct access" choice allows large energy end-users
(or small ones who organize to purchase energy) the option of
contracting directly with generators. Large users have already signed
onto such arrangements with some energy companies at rates reflecting
historical market levels and well below recent and current rates.
Commissioners supporting suspension have argued that limited numbers
of larger end-users would negotiate such terms and add to the burden of
debt repayment and higher rate recompense to be carried by those
remaining in the system and not striking such deals. Indeed, the rate
escalation has led to many large industrial users signing such separate
contracts for themselves on advantageous terms. However, the PUC
suspension was not applied retroactively, allowing those who entered
into such agreements to benefit from them and avoid the higher rates
now in place and planned.
The PUC also signaled its opposition to the plan to eliminate its
meaningful review of new revenue requirements for utilities arising
from DWR energy purchases. Such revenue requirements are passed
onto ratepayers and may reflect the now improvident forty-one longterm power contracts entered into by DWR. Further, unlike the PUC,
DWR does not conduct public proceedings and is not subject to the
hearing, participation, and evidentiary standards of the PUC. DWR is
headed not by a commission that must meet publicly to decide policy,
but by a single political appointee of the Governor, who serves at his
pleasure and who may decide issues in an office without public hearing
or disclosure.
The Governor issued an angry press release that a failure to approve
assured ratepayer pass-through of these charges jeopardized the security
of planned $12.5 billion in state bonds to pay for the $10.4 billion in
power bought since January 2001 (and additional sums anticipated for
182. Id. (quoting statement of "full support" by Paul Aronzen, legal counsel for the Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors).
183. Carrie Peyton, California Regulators End "Customer Choice" Option for Buying
Power, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 21, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27935950.
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the remainder of the year). Failure to issue those bonds would leave the
general fund from which these monies have been taken radically short
of expected revenue under the 2001-2002 fiscal state budget (at the
very time an economic downturn otherwise reduced anticipated
revenue). 184 After condemning the failure to approve assured ratepayer
pass-through for all prior and future decisions of DWR, the Governor
further responded by (a) conceding that some renegotiation of the longterm contracts may be in order, and (b) ordering a statewide hiring
85
freeze.1
68. On October 1, 2001, the PUC formally broke ranks with the
Governor to argue before FERC that the state's long-term energy
contracts imposed excessive prices on California ratepayers and should
not be approved. 186 As the argument was presented, California peak
prices stood at $30 per megawatt-hour while contracted prices stipulated
$69.187 The agency specifically objected to the high prices agreed to
with PacifiCorp Power Marketing Inc., Alliance Colton L.L.C., Sempra
Energy, and Calpine Corporation. 188 The last two firms account for
about one-half of the volume agreed to among the fifty-three
agreements signed as of October, some of which have twenty-year
89
terms. 1
69. On October 2, 2001, the PUC announced a "settlement" with
Southern California Edison in the Filed Rate Doctrine lawsuit that
Edison had filed in federal court against the PUC in November 2000.'90
Edison had lost early rounds of the litigation and a similar suit by
PG&E in federal court had failed. However, the settlement allowed
what consumer advocates termed a "dirty backroom deal" at ratepayer
expense after the legislative defeat of a similar scheme. 19 1 The
agreement, reached after secret negotiations and approved by United

184. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Makes Statement on Public Utilities
Commission Actions (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.governor.ca.gov.
185. See, e.g., George Skelton, Taking Hits on Energy, Davis Jabs at FERC, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2002; Office of the Governor, Executive Orders D-48-01 and D-49-01, Oct. 24, 2001,
available at http://www.govemor.ca.gov.
186. Bernadette Tansey, State PUC Seeks to Void Davis' Power Contracts, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
1, 2001, at Al, availableat 2001 WL 3415856.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Jerry Hirsch, Utility Could Be on its Feet in 6 Months, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at
A15, available at 2001 WL 2522821.
191. See Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, Bailout Watch #82, Oct. 4, 2001,
availableat http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/utilities/st/st002020.php3.
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States District Court Judge Ronald S.W. Lew on October 5, 2001,192
compels SCE customers to pay $3 billion over the next four years. The
deal was advertised as involving no rate hikes for consumers and would
prohibit common stock utility dividends until 2003. However, SCE
customers had been assessed a substantial forty percent rate hike which
was advertised as "temporary" but which will now stay in effect at least
through 2003. Some commentators predict that rates will then be raised
as dividends begin to flow to SCE stockholders, both timed for post2002 election imposition. More importantly, contrary to the initial PUC
press release indicating that only $2.3 billion of the $3.3 billion
allegedly owed by the utility to power generators would be paid (with
stockholder deferral of dividends making up the $1 billion to be
absorbed by the utility), the agreement in fact commits ratepayers to
provide the entire $3.3 billion. The agreement does require SCE to
cooperate in ongoing FERC and court proceedings to lower or challenge
energy company compensation claims, which must be used entirely to
reduce the debt owed by ratepayers. However, it removes the PUC as a
legal basis for such denial, and essentially adjudicates all of SCE's
purchases of power as "prudent" and fully compensable by ratepayers.
SCE stock rose fourteen percent on Wall Street.
Consumer advocates immediately appealed to the United States Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the "settlement" arranges a rate
matter through the auspices of a federal court proceeding lacking the
required open hearing and due process elements applicable to PUC
193
decision making.
Present Status: The state is attempting to float the largest general
revenue bond in the state's history at $12.5 billion. As noted above,
that issuance involves substantial direct interest expense, reduction of
state capacity for other infrastructure and higher education supporting
revenue bonds, and general fund reductions as interest payments are
deducted by state taxpayers.
Utility rates have already increased substantially, far beyond any cost
factor and accomplished rates of return for power generators possible
only with monopoly power, horizontal price fixing, or serious scarcity
or other market flaw.

192. Nancy Rivera Brooks & David Rosenzweig, The State Deal OKd to Avert Edison
Bankruptcy Courts, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at B I, available at 2001 WL 28918366.
193. Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, U.S. Court of Appeals Puts Edison Bailout
on Hold, Oct. 30, 2001, available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/utilities/pr/pr002061.
php3.
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The overall direct cost may be calculated by taking the cost of energy
purchased in 1999, at about $9 billion, and calculating the year 2000
and likely 2001 cost to be paid, the first at close to $50 billion and the
latter at around $35 billion. The monies paid constitute substantial
excess profits, mostly to out-of-state companies purchasing utilitydevolved power plants during deregulation's transition period. The
revenues from the year 2000 alone will pay the entire purchase price
incurred for most of them.
The approximately $55 billion in
overcharges (beyond reasonable rates of return) in 2000 and 2001 are
reflected in three pots: (a) public monies for purchases at a high price
from the general fund and which must be repaid, (b) higher rates the
utilities have imposed as outlined in the chronology above, and (c)
additional sums from prior energy costs unpaid which they allegedly
owe the generators.
The last "debt" category has created the three major arenas for
repayment: the PG&E bankruptcy, the Davis-Sempra (SDG&E) MOU,
and the Davis-Edison MOU. As discussed above, 194 the last has been
altered into a PUC-SCE litigation settlement agreement that
approves-without public proceedings-all SCE energy purchasing
decisions (implicitly including the DWR purchase portion) and
promises payment of the $3.2 billion in energy company claims unless
reduced by FERC or ancillary court challenges (which appear to be
problematical).
Indirect costs and damage from the debacle recounted above exceed
these substantial direct amounts. They include the cost of the new
Power Authority. And more significantly, they have effectively
suspended substantial new general fund spending, particularly for
investment in children (higher education, foster care children, and other
accounts, as discussed above). Other costs include the massive
consequences arising from the pervasive dependency of the state's
economy on energy provision. Those costs include the bankruptcy of
numerous small businesses relying on cost-related energy costs in their
own equipment investments, from pizza ovens to air conditioning to
industrial equipment. They include higher consumer prices for a vast
array of products and services where such costs may be passed on due
to their industry-wide imposition.
The total price to be paid by California for the deregulation errors
may dwarf all prior public purchasing and corruption scandals,
including the infamous Teapot Dome scandal of New York, and even

194. See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
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exceed the California portion of the savings and loan meltdown of the
1980s.
III. CORRECTING THE THREE ERRORS

As acknowledged above, deregulation can benefit consumers. The
free market can be the consumer's most precious asset. The praises
attributed to deregulation are well in evidence where it functions as
intended: It allocates resources efficiently, responds quickly, and is
driven by consumer preferences from the bottom. It rewards those who
serve the public and penalizes those who fail to do so. But as argued
above, it requires preconditions to operate, and it can be corrupted into a
top-driven, malevolent, and coercive creature-possessing few of the
attributes commending it.
The historic record of deregulation is mixed. It has been driven by
some reasonable basis in most cases, a basis usually borne of the
possible expansion of market forces into areas previously subject to
unnecessary state regulation. However, the three flaws discussed above
consistently appear to undercut its promise. Notwithstanding the
clich6s about "lessons of history" precluding repetition, errors have here
been repeated. The architects of deregulation in one industry do not
always consult with those experienced in the deregulation of other
industries.
Forebodingly, all three of these flaws coalesce to afflict energy
deregulation and, if the exercise of these flaws in other industries is a
guide, their correction will be difficult to accomplish. Deregulation
often releases political forces operating apart from rational argument or
real economic justification. The paradigm example of such pessimism
can be found in the cable industry-replete with antitrust offenses,
unfettered monopoly power without meaningful price regulation, and
concentration trends reaching into Internet access to threaten the
diversity and competitive future of our most important industry: the
world's communication assets. Now the other major underlying
industry "affected with the public interest" as the leading case of Munn
v. Illinois 95 terms it, threatens to follow suit. The stakes in the cases of
both of these critical, underlying industries are high. One threatens the
future of First Amendment diversity with momentous implications for
political democracy, while the other underlies our society from
manufacturing to services to virtually everything that can move or make
a sound or generate heat or refrigerate food or light a room.

195.

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
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The detailed chronology recounted above outlines the nature of the
current struggle, the players, and the manifestation of all three factors
underlying deregulation's failures to date.
A. The Extreme Pendulum Swing
As argued above, an industry once deregulated must be subject to
competition and consumer protection statutes in the fullest sense. That
did not happen in the case of energy deregulation, which failed in the
following four respects.
1. Retained Conflicts of Interest
The first non-negotiable element in proper deregulation is the clear
separation between the deregulated industry now to be subject to
competition and the remaining monopoly power regulated enterprise.
The two cannot be mixed. The reason for that separation is wellillustrated by the energy debacle recounted above. But it is more basic.
As argued above, those with monopoly power will invariably attempt to
use it to gain advantage in competitive markets. This observation of
human behavior is supported by the considerable record of reported
antitrust cases and by predictable human behavior. Accordingly, the
first mistake made in energy deregulation was to allow the parent
corporations of those retaining monopoly power to become involved in
energy generation or to hold energy-related assets. Ideally, if one
operates the loop, one operates the loop. Period. Deregulation assumes
that economies-of-scale between the remaining monopoly and newly
deregulated sectors are lacking. If the remaining regulated utility
wishes to invest in shrimp boats in Louisiana with invested funds, so be
it, but not natural gas fields, coal deposits, or pipeline transmission
assets.
Such enterprises have a momentous task: They operate a monopoly
loop in a manner that must be fair to all users. We do not allow United
Airlines to own airports (indeed, when airlines have operated travel
agency computer systems, predictable favoritism and problems
developed). The monopoly power "wheeling" of any underlying
commodity, be it water aqueducts, electricity, natural gas, or
telecommunications, must be undertaken by an enterprise lacking any
direct or indirect conflict in the judgments it must make about
connection, cost, and terms of transport. We not only rely on such
facilities to deliver the fruits of free market enterprise, but often to serve
as the consumer surrogate in making purchases-certainly that has been
the case with energy utilities. Instead of creating a structure amenable
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to that end, we have unwisely permitted conflicts of interest to permeate
electricity deregulation.
2. Removing the Preconditions for Free Market Pricing
Basic economic doctrine teaches us that free market pricing works
optimally where many competitors price independently.
That
independence is so substantial that a unilateral decision by any one
entrepreneur will not affect the equilibrium price. However, energy
regulation in California was created in a manner rigged in favor of
abusive monopoly power ratesetting by incorporating the following
elements: (a) more than fifty percent of energy generation would be
devolved to a small group of five providers; (b) those providers each
employ professional staff devoted to the common and esoteric function
of predicting demand, supply, and optimum bidding strategy; (c) the
state-arranged market entities carry with them no mandate to protect the
public, but were charged to merely react passively to the bidding and
supply decisions made by energy suppliers; (d) the providers each had
immediate and detailed information about demand and other bids (what
antitrust prosecutors refer to as a "detection mechanism" important to
the successful cartel arrangement of collusively arranged prices); (e)
almost all sales were to be priced on a "spot market" basis, with very
few long-term contracts; (f) capacity expansion has been expensive and
has taken substantial time to effectuate; and (g) a final "market clearing
price" on the spot market would refer back to and increase previously
agreed lower prices over the previous day, giving all participants their
own individual incentives to inflate such "real time" pricing where
possible. All of these elements were combined in a context of a severe
"non-zero sum game" where supply reduction and higher bids have
assisted (indeed, enriched) all participants.
All other things being equal, human beings do not always compete.
Where common ground can be found, and where practices may be to
mutual benefit, cooperation can occur. It often does. Where the
alternative is between marginal profits versus $40 billion in profit, one
might predict a measure of such cooperative behavior. The trick is to
establish preconditions to make such cooperation difficult, to make
competition the only feasible alternative. In the case of energy, those
preconditions would involve (a) reduced concentration among energy
providers (preferably more than ten major corporations providing the
energy now provided by the "Big Five"), (b) some determination of
meaningful competition (as discussed below), (c) no useful detection
mechanism (which facilitates price fixing), and (d) no retroactive
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application of spot market prices. California energy deregulation failed
to provide all four of these prudent preconditions.
3. Failure to Monitor for / Enforce Price Fixing Offenses
In the case of energy deregulation, a cadre of technical experts
engaged in the sophisticated and involved tasks of predicting demand,
needed supply, and optimum bids.
To what extent do these experts move between competing firms? To
what extent do communications occur? How does this consulting
industry use common data? What are the trade associations in this field
doing? While a great deal of trade association activity may be
immunized from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, 196 that immunity reach is limited.
In the famous Containercase, 197 the United States Supreme Court
found a combination where participants simply used a common
publication to calculate prices, without a common explicit agreement to
collude. The prices narrowed after the publication was circulated and
used, indicating that a communication was having an "artificial" effect
on prices.
Whether the energy firms dominating electricity production in
California post-deregulation have committed antitrust offenses is
unsettled and may await further litigation. However, it appears that no
"antitrust cop" was on the beat in the state, from either state or federal
jurisdictions. An active presence in the form of corporate monitoring
may by itself impede such combinations. Such monitoring and inquiry
did not begin until much damage had been done, and which may not be
undone.
4. Removal of the Backstop of "Meaningful Competition" Assurance
The State of California claims that the jurisdiction of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission includes the obligation to warrant
"meaningful competition" in the interstate wholesale provision of
electric power. And federal law allows for the imposition of some
ceiling on such charges where arbitrary and excessive prices are
imposed. As noted above, FERC so acted, but in a limited fashion and
only after substantial harm occurred.

196. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
197. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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California erred in relying on FERC as a backstop. It properly
establishes its own backstop; an affirmative obligation of its PUC to
certify that meaningful competition is in place. Prices in excess of two
or three times the normal fair rate of return should constitute a
presumption that the market is not properly functioning. Where the
PUC cannot affirmatively find continuing competition, it must impose
rate ceilings.
Such rate ceilings are not intended to reverse
deregulation, and-in a proper deregulation setting-might never be
invoked. But where needed they must be available.
Nor must such ceilings be at a "fair rate of return" level. The choice
of deregulation implies the acceptance that some enterprises may go out
of business, and others may make substantial profit. But substantial
profit normally implies a premium above fair rate of return levels,
perhaps a substantial premium. Profits that are at levels four, five, ten
or fifty times fair rate of return levels do not signal a functioning
market.
California energy deregulation omitted this critical backstop.
B. External Costs
At least two different types of external costs were inadequately
addressed by California energy deregulation. As noted above, the
utilities protested the proposed PUC policy to enhance alternative
energy supply, arguing that "lowest obtainable" price should be the
standard. Regrettably, FERC adopted that position. The decision was
wrong not only because it deprived the state of supply it would later
need (discussed below), but also because it continues the longstanding
pattern of favoritism for nonrenewable energy use.
Our great grandchildren and certainly their great grandchildren are
going to be asking how we could ethically use exhaustible resources so
wastefully, and how we could impose contaminated waste with
thousands of years of radiation hazard on future generations.
Deregulation removes the regulatory cross-subsidy handle. While some
favoritism for alternative energy remains with California deregulation, it
is at a token level in relation to our responsibility to our progeny.
Accordingly, deregulation properly involves "depletion" or
"contaminated waste" tax imposition, with proceeds properly invested
in alternative-renewable energy provisions. The tax should start at a
low level, but gradually increase as depletion proceeds.
The market does not gauge the true costs of such depletion given
imperfect knowledge, long-term investment in machinery type, and the
curvilinear nature of depletion's effect on price in a "natural"
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marketplace. Adjustment for those externalities is appropriate. We
have not started that process seriously to date.
Related to the nonrenewable resource externality problem is the
scarcity flaw that occurs with energy provision, as discussed below.
C. Scarcity
Perhaps the most basic flaw in energy deregulation is the assumption
that the only basis for price regulation is a "natural monopoly"
structure, and if one simply partitions the monopoly power sector off in
a new format, newly freed enterprise will function without further
concern. But regulation may also be warranted where there is scarcity,
as suggested in the discussion above. Indeed, perhaps no industry
imposes more harm than does this one where scarcity occurs.
Electricity provision is one of the few industries where consumers
lacking direct contract with providers essentially give a blank check to
generators. We use power, the utilities buy what we use, and then we
are billed post hoc. Over time, our purchases will be affected by price
changes, but not immediately. The elasticity of demand has some
important limitations caused by substantial investment in electricity as
an underlying energy source, and by its use for basic necessities, such as
heat, air conditioning, refrigeration, and light.
Where scarcity occurs, two problems arise under California's
deregulation scheme: (1) price hikes driven by "real time" bidding
without bargaining power on the purchaser side, and (2) the possibility
of rolling blackouts, voltage reduction, or other involuntary and grossly
applied cutbacks.
One policy which should have long been in place is the ability of the
state to itself provide a three to five percent buffer of power beyond
peak need from its own resources as needed. The notion of state
intervention to assure needed supply where scarcity interrupts the
market or creates external cost is a well-settled policy in many areas.
Indeed, it is commonly used where it has no justification. For example,
we subsidize milk under the theory that even a temporary shortage
would impose grievous external costs (presumably on young children
needing formula). While price supports for milk have a dubious
connection to that rationale, assurance of an assured surplus to prevent
energy scarcity does have merit. That assurance can be provided by a
number of means, but the most reliable is a publicly funded and
provided capacity.
Meanwhile, the state has a strong interest in lessening the extent of
demand variations (the degree of peaking) by educating the public as to
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their incidence, and by implementing time-of-day rate variations. A
rational market will price peak traffic at a higher rate where it imposes
capacity expansion costs. Where energy is used during peak demand
conditions, its price should increase, and consumers should be
repeatedly so informed. Neither occurs in California.
Time of day rate variation, in addition to the state's own three to five
percent reserve capacity, should be accompanied by proper incentives to
build and expand capacity as needed. That is now happening, but not
on an optimum long-term rational basis. Instead, there is a drive to put
plants on line, any plants, many consisting of high cost gas-fired
turbines. A system of "peakers" operating with the efficiency of "funny
car drag racers" is not the most desirable end result of state energy
policy.
D. Immediate: Do Not Pay
California has "unwound" much of its deregulation by direct state
intervention in energy purchases. The rationale for the state's approach
as recounted in the chronology above is simple. Confronted with cartellike pricing, the consumers organize through the state to develop a
"monopsony" (a buyer's monopoly) to even the playing field. But the
results have been mixed. In the short term, the public negotiators
appear to have been flamboozled (yet again) by private enterprise into
committing the state to long-term purchases of power at two to three
times the present and likely future spot price in a properly functioning
market. That commitment extends for some contracts over the next
twenty years, and totals $43 billion. It is unclear why the state decided
to negotiate such prices at a point of apparent bargaining power
weakness for such a lengthy term. A more prudent course would have
been a three-year commitment until a competitive market can be
created, at a level equivalent to anticipated demand plus a reserve at
three to five percent beyond that projected demand.
More important are the longer-term implications. Will DWR become
the energy purchaser for the state? Why? Under what procedures for
public participation (if any)? What will the new Energy Authority
really do? What is the PUC's role? Thus far, the state has been putting
out a fire, and should be forgiven for its lack of long-term vision. But
even short-term fixes may be assisted by such a vision. My own
preference will surprise my consumer advocate colleagues-I would not
reregulate as before. In particular, such reregulation is likely to be on
the post "fair rate of return" basis ("incentive rate regulation") now in
vogue, and which has its own considerable flaws and dangers.
Moreover, energy provision is an industry that is theoretically amenable
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to an enhanced measure of competition. The problem is not with the
concept, but with its execution. Unfortunately, the execution has been
incompetent in extremis, replete with conflicts of interest, policies
ignorant of basic economics and of antitrust history.
So what is the state to do? Ideally, apply a "fair rate of return"
standard to energy providers. That rate of return may be enhanced
somewhat beyond market levels and may assure such a fair rate of
return plant by plant-thus not disadvantaging inefficient energy
providers. All sums that are charged beyond those levels are void and
uncollectible. Such a prescription does not violate notions that "a deal
is a deal." The system theoretically includes a prohibition on collusion
and a FERC backstop. It also includes a utility obligation to make
prudent purchases properly not influenced by the conflicting holdings of
corporate parents. And it operates against a backdrop where energy
providers arguably have a common-carrier like obligation to provide
available capacity-one that has arguably been violated.
In return for such an agreement (involving the cancellation of about
two-thirds of the revenues claimed by energy providers), the state would
provide immunity from antitrust prosecution, breach of duty and
contract actions, unfair competition actions now pending, and civil
actions to compel FERC to fulfill its statutory duty post hoc to bar
excessive charges.
Then the state would implement deregulation with the safeguards
outlined above.
IV. THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM: THE FREE MARKETEER AS
RELIGIOUS ZEALOT

Underlying the three common empirical flaws in deregulation is a
philosophical failure, a misunderstanding of the role and nature of the
marketplace. Such ignorance is centered among the most faithful
disciples of the market, the "University of Chicago" school of
economics. Many of its disciples have elevated the concept of the
"market" to deity status. The implicit assumption: The "free market" is
the ideal economic model. It is an end to itself. Indeed, it has magical
properties. It is self-correcting. Most flaws, certainly those that the
government tries to address, will be handled by the market's own
operation if only left to function of its own accord. Price fixing? It
cannot last long; cheaters will be too tempted, for as the excess prices
grow higher, the incentive to undercut slightly and capture market share
grows as well. As to other alleged antitrust-type abuses, barriers to
entry are never very high. In the long run, almost any flaw will correct
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itself as demanded by the informed consumer, and in the long run a free
democracy assures that the consumer will be, or will become, so
informed. Eventually, ashes to ashes, dust to dust. Take the long view
and, overall, the market will do what is right. The Soviet fall and the
collapse of the planned economies controlled by bureaucratic fiat
further demonstrates its merit. Unlike the flawed and inherently
uninformed decisions of agencies, the market's hand is more beneficent,
more responsive to the popular will, and its rewards are more secure. If
the state removes itself, the market will decide production, and
allocation, and will assure the elimination of the incompetent and the
prosperity of those who serve us well.
Many place the same kind of trust in the market as the religious
faithful confer to their respective gods. Voltaire's classic satire Candide
skewered the so-called "Optimist" view presented through the voice of
Pangloss. Pangloss enunciated a still familiar refrain: "God created the
universe and is all powerful and all knowing. Anything that happens
occurs as part of His grand design, and hence happens for the best
because God wills it so." Although providing a measure of needed
comfort, this sentiment can also serve as the basis for human abdication.
On its own terms, such a God is curious, for He also created the human
ability to predict and to apply values to empirical reality. Presumably,
His creatures exercise free will within the range of their capacity.
Simply substitute "market" for God as Pangloss speaks, and one is
not too far from the implicit view of many "free market" economists.
These adherents engage in the same mental process as a religious zealot.
Take a means to an end, and make it the end itself. Give an abstraction
that inherently stands for pieces of reality its own identity, and regard
that abstraction as the goal. This process, called "reification," can
transform religious faith into a destructive force of intolerance based on
the ephemera of clothing and ritual. In this basic sense, such free
market theorists do not have an economic philosophy, but a religion.
Reality is to be filtered to accommodate their predetermined
commitment to their faith: a God who proves His merit not through
incantations and the promise of everlasting life, but through the miracle
of the Invisible Hand.
Such a view of the market as an object of irrational obeisance is at the
heart of our current problem with deregulation. Let's take the critical
recent example: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission need not
limit interstate energy prices because any excess is the product of
inadequate supply, and the best way to restore supply is to provide a
profit incentive. Limiting that profit impedes the supply increase that is
at the heart of the problem. The non sequitur application of this
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sentiment is as follows: Allow power generators to charge not merely an
incentive premium above cost to stimulate supply, but double, three
times, five times, ten times, one hundred times, or more. Never mind
the sunk investment of thousands of small businesses now driven out.
Never mind the external costs to seniors who can't afford heat or air
conditioning, or the crashed budgets of public schools or a thousand
other costs borne by others. If energy costs go from $9 billion to $50
billion, so be it. The excess is needed so that the market can selfcorrect. And eventually it will self-correct. Ashes to ashes, dust to
dust.
One has to be an extreme zealot, as FERC has exemplified, to carry
fidelity to an abstract concept beyond its rationale, and to such a level of
temporal harm. Such a concept must supersede its raison d'tre. It
must be reified into deity status. Its disciples are not genuine public
officials imbued with the public trust, but worshipers who rely on faith
and who dismiss all empirical consequences. Indeed, human sacrifice is
to be tolerated for the larger good, for the longer range. We must do
what we must do to pay homage to God, to Allah, to the market. Let the
consequences come, they are for the best, for it will eventually make it
right.
This current irrationality is exacerbated by an implicit "naturalist"
view of the market by its semper fidelis followers. Their market is
essentially the natural state of affairs emerging from the removal of
hamstringing, red tape-interfering regulatory agencies. A utopian state
is achieved with the simple bromide of state withdrawal. The theory:
Without interference from government, the magic of the market is
assured.
To be sure, the market can be a highly efficient, optimum device for
the allocation of production and resources, for immediate
responsiveness to demand from the bottom, for natural selection reward
of those who perform. But it is not an a priori body or state of being. It
is necessarily the product of human interaction, influenced by
underlying wealth distribution and inheritance which operate far from
egalitarian principles, by common law traditions (when does liability
pass in a transaction?), by the culture, education and consumer
knowledge, technology and information exchange facility, tort law and
assessment, the criminal justice system, and even language. Its
performance to accomplish properly cited advantages depends upon
preconditions, from traditional Smithsonian theory (e.g., many
independent actors) to modern reality (e.g., antitrust enforcement). Its
operation can impose external costs that threaten fundamental ethical
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imperatives (e.g., leaving behind adequate resources and an
environment for our legatees through the millennia to come).
The description offered above of "free market school" myopia is
exaggerated, but not by much. Nor is it the product of a "government
can do no wrong" counter-school. Far from it. As noted above, this
author was among the first to vigorously advocate for deregulation in
the case of trucking. This author spent a decade defending and
advancing the free market as an antitrust prosecutor. The advantages of
an effective market for consumers are substantial. And the errors and
omissions of human from-the-top management are too numerous for
any human to even catalogue. Accordingly, where the prerequisites for
a free market are present, it ought to be more than a mere "tool," and is
entitled to presumptive status. But a presumption may be rebutted, not
based on the mere incantation of "health and safety," but on
demonstrable and serious cost or failure-costs which exceed the price
of correction.
Appropriate adjustments, so that a market functions optimally, need
not always involve a maximum fair rate of return rate regulation, or
even agency licensure or executive branch regulation at all. Preferably,
it would be accomplished as a first resort by restoring preconditions
needed for an effective market, and in the second resort by change to
underlying ground rules (e.g., a rule of liability, or a tax or fee, or an
incentive). But intervention is not to be eschewed based on the ethereal
"magic" of market reliance, or on ideological zealotry that elevates
abstract concept to a false reality and subverts reason to pre-ordained
faith.

872

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

APPENDIX: A GLOSSARY OF DEREGULATION TERMS

California energy rate regulation has proceeded in a time-continuum
from the 1990s to projected post-2002 as follows: (1) traditional "fair
rate of return" ratemaking, which allows prudent costs and a return on
capital investment; (2) "performance-based" ratemaking, which takes
prior costs and credits the utility with efficiency gains to add profit and
incentive (either to supplement fair rate of return ratemaking, or more
ominously to substantially replace it); (3) "transition" ratesetting for the
utility operations which will remain under regulation as assets are sold
or released for competition based pricing (such as power generation);
and (4) "post-transition" ratesetting for the remaining monopoly power
utility.
The progression of regulatory policy through these four stages has
created a phalanx of new terms of art, acronyms, agencies and
proceedings, which is bewildering even to some informed observers.
The following glossary facilitates understanding of the extraordinary
developments over the past three years.
* "Revenue Requirement." The estimated amount of money a
utility subject to maximum rate regulation should produce. Note that
rates are set in advance, before all of the costs incurred to produce
energy are precisely known. Hence, ratesetting is analogous to shooting
at a moving target. Allowable rates are gauged to achieve "projected
revenue requirement" based on cost projections. Adjustments are then
made to the next annual "revenue requirement" based on actual costs
and performance during the prior year.
* "Unbundling." To separate out a function from maximum rate
regulation and other regulatory control in reliance on competition alone.
* "Bundled consumers." Those consumers who do not have a
separate contract with an energy source to provide power for them but
rely instead on the choices made by the utility to provide energy.
* "Competition Transition Cost" (CTC). A special charge imposed
on ratepayers to compensate utilities for a physical plant (e.g.,
uneconomic power generation) that is being "unbundled" and will not
be competitively marketable.
* "Utility Distribution Company" (UDC).
The remaining
monopoly power utility, which will continue to control the wires routed
to homes and businesses carrying power.
* "Electricity Service Providers" (ESPs). The power generators
unbundled from utilities and subject to competitive pricing without
maximum rate control from the PUC.
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* "Qualifying Facility" (QF) refers to an energy producer qualified
by the FERC to distribute wholesale power.
• "Performance-Based Ratemaking" (PBR). Rate setting system
under which utilities' rates are set according to an average market price
for electricity. If a UDC is able to purchase electricity for less than the
benchmark price, the savings are split between the ratepayers and the
utility's stockholders. The theory behind PBR is to give the utility an
incentive to improve efficiency by allowing it to share in savings, to
provide a reward similar to that extant in the free market for improved
performance. However, the calculations made under this more nebulous
standard lack the reference point of fair rate-of-return analysis that
monitors excessive profit.
* "Annual Transition Cost Proceedings" (ATCP). Proceedings to
establish utility costs during the transition period of 1998-2002, and
upon which performance-based ratemaking calculations will be made.
* "Revenue Adjustment Proceeding" (RAP).
The final and
comprehensive proceeding to set rates for the UDC (remaining utility
subject to rate regulation).
* The "Power Exchange" (PX) functions like a stock exchange,
enabling sellers and buyers to bargain for a "spot" or immediate price
for electricity.
* The "Independent System Operator" (ISO) is an entity which
assumed control of the power grid that transmits electricity statewide
between the respective utilities controlling local delivery.
* The "Electricity Oversight Board" oversees the operations of the
ISO (above). Its 26 members serve without compensation and include
representatives of the three major utilities, the state's four major public
utilities, power generators, and consumer representatives.
* "Market Valuation" refers to the determination of "market value"
for assets retained by the utilities after power generating assets, et al.,
are sold and "unbundled" during the "transition" to deregulation. (For
purposes of ratesetting during transition, the values of assets being sold
are set retrospectively at the sale price that is obtained.)

